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INTRODUCTION TO THE SPECIAL ISSUE

Political psychology is an interdisciplinary field of scientific research, focused on studying the psychological basis of political behavior and attitudes, influence of political context on individual and group behavior, psychological effects of political actions, and so on. It is a growing interdisciplinary field, founded at the intersection of social psychology and political science, but also sharing both the topics and researchers with sociology, education, and economics.

While social sciences have studied psychological aspects of politics for decades, even centuries, political psychology appeared as an institutionalized discipline some forty years ago. In 1978, professor Jeanne N. Knutson founded the International Society of Political Psychology (ISPP), which soon attracted wide membership worldwide. The Society initiated an academic journal, *Political Psychology*, which is currently among the top academic journals both in social psychology and in political science.

Over the last two decades, research in political psychology spread across the former socialist world as well. Challenges of social and political transformations towards the West European political models created a need for scientific study of psychological aspects of the involved processes and phenomena. Scholars of different generations, whether or not they call themselves a political psychologist, are studying the most pressing issues these societies are facing. This research often reaches close to the ancient social science ideal – to continue expanding our understanding of human behavior and to do service to the society.

An impressive overview of political psychology research in the South-Eastern region of Europe was presented at the Mini Conference on Political Psychology in South-Eastern Europe, held in Novi Sad (Serbia), in October 2016 (<http://psihologija.ff.uns.ac.rs/ispp2016/>). The Conference was supported and partly sponsored by the ISSP and by the Department of Psychology, University of Novi Sad, Serbia. Dozens of presented papers, covering a wide range of topics, from prejudice to political tolerance, from ethnic conflicts and violence to peace marches in Hungary, clearly demonstrated that the gathered researchers do not hesitate to address the burning and controversial issues, nor that they compromise their theory and method.

This special issue of *Primenjena psihologija* presents a selection of papers from this Mini Conference, together with some contributions first appearing in this issue. Although it was not planned, it turned out that all of the included papers, in one way or another, deal with Serbia, and involve at least some authors from Serbia. This unintended situation turned this special issue also into a showcase of political psychology research in Serbia. Even a cursory review of the papers leaves the impression of a wide range of socially very relevant topics, concern for psychological theory, and insistence on sound research methodology.

At this point, I would like to remind readers that the quality and quantity of political psychology research in Serbia has roots in the long tradition of politically-related research of Serbian psychologists. While great names of Serbian social psychology, such as Nikola Rot, Dragomir Pantić, Ljiljana Bačević, Mirjana Vasović, Bora Kuzmanović, and others, probably would not call themselves political psychologists, a significant portion of their work would fit into the contemporary category of political psychology. A recently published chapter by Dragomir Pantić and Zoran Pavlović (2016) illuminates the not so well-known origins of scientific research dealing with political attitudes, values, opinions in Serbia. With such roots, the academic level of the papers included in this volume is not surprising.

The following several paragraphs will provide a brief review of the papers in this special issue. Conflicts and wars that accompanied the collapse of the former Yugoslavia, and psychological consequence thereof, represent one of the major themes that preoccupy psychologists in Serbia. Tijana Karić, Vladimir Mihić, and José Ángel Ruiz Jiménez focus on the psychological aspects of collective memory. How do Serbian respondents react to collective memory stimuli that are presented from different angles, i.e., from the angles of the conflicted ethnic groups – Serbs, Bosniaks, and Croats? Their study analyzes how such stimuli impact respondents' stereotypes, social distance, and national identification.

Consequences of the post-Yugoslav conflicts are even more in the focus of Professor Miklos Biro's text "Public opinion in Serbia on ICTY: A chicken or an egg?". The establishment, mode of operation, and sentences passed (and not passed) by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) have been highly controversial in Serbia. Biro's review of public opinion research evidence shows that the level of negative attitudes among the public toward the ICTY could be connected with the rhetoric of the Serbian political elite, and the way that media handled this issue.

Post-Yugoslav history is also reflected in Huseyin Cakal and Nebojša Petrović paper titled "Intergroup contact and ingroup identification as predictors of intergroup attitudes and forgiveness in the Serbian context: The moderating role of exposure to positive information". Here, the authors use a survey experiment to study the role of exposure to positive information on intergroup attitudes and forgiveness. One of their many interesting findings is that past contacts with members of the outgroup persist as significant predictors of present-day outgroup attitudes, in this case of Serbs towards Bosniak Muslims.

The remaining two papers deal with more explicitly political topics. Boban Petrović and Janko Međedović examine how the lexically derived ideological dimensions are associated with party preferences, and whether and how these relationship changed over time. Interestingly, contrary to what we could expect assuming the existence of the process of "democratic learning", it seems that the association between party preference and ideological dimensions is decreasing over time. Pavlović and Todosijević, in their paper "Authoritarianism and cognitive, political involvement", address the neglected question of whether authori-

tarianism is associated with political cognition. The answer is nuanced: high authoritarianism is associated with lower factual political knowledge, but not with political interest and interest in election campaigns. Apparently, transitory political context can make high authoritarians more or less interested, but political knowledge seems to be a more stable correlate of authoritarianism.

To summarize, the papers included in this volume illustrate the wide range of topics, approaches and research methods that characterize political psychology in Serbia. While the psychological study of politics in earlier decades relied almost exclusively on survey research and focused on attitudes towards actual political issues, current political psychology is more varied both theoretically and methodologically. It also appears that the tumultuous events of the last two decades provided additional stimuli for younger researchers to engage in political psychology research.

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Reference

- Pantić, D., & Pavlović, Z. (2016). Public opinion research in Serbia in the non-pluralist period. In K. Bachmann & J. Gieseke (Eds.), *The silent majority in communist and post-communist states: Opinion polling in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe* (pp. 43–58). New York: Peter Lang. doi:10.3726/978-3-653-06119-2

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STEREOTYPES IN YOUNG SERBS ABOUT CROATS AND BOSNIAKS PROVOKED BY COLLECTIVE MEMORY STIMULI²

Not many studies have dealt with how Serbs from Serbia see Croats and Bosniaks in the light of the wars from 1990s. In our study, we used a quasi-experimental approach to assess the type of stereotypes provoked in Serbs, and their relationship to social distance and the national identity. The sample consisted of 66 participants of Serbian ethnicity, born between 1991 and 1995, who are residing in Serbia. The instruments included Social Distance Scale, National Identity Scale, socio-demographic questionnaire and a set of collective memory stimuli followed by a set of questions. As stimuli, we used shortened versions of collective memories as described by Ruiz Jiménez (2013), in order to set a context which referred to the 1990s wars. The results have shown that the described stimuli have impact neither on stereotypes nor on the social distance and the national identity of participants. However, the social distance is lower than in previous studies in the region, and Croats are consistently seen in more negative terms than Bosniaks and Serbs.

Keywords: stereotypes, collective memory, social distance, national identity

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The conflicts that started as secession wars in ex-Yugoslavia and turned out to be inter-ethnic conflicts which fame was widely spread as the bloody one have left to day consequences that pervade almost every aspect of the people's lives in Bosnia-Herzegovina and somewhat less in Croatia, even more than 20 years after the end of the armed conflicts. The wars were lead on the territories of B&H and Croatia, while at the same time people in Serbia were concentrated on surviving the infamous 1990s sanctions. Although most of the people who were directly involved in the battlefields were from Croatia and B&H, there were volunteer fighters from Serbia and soldiers of the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) engaged in a direct battle. Many people fled to Serbia from the territories in question, especially from Croatia after the military operation called 'The Storm', and have never returned to their homes. B&H was left divided by the Dayton Agreement between the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was mainly inhabited by the Muslims and Croats in Herzegovina post-war, and the Republic of Srpska, with the most of its citizens being Serbs. In both Croatia and B&H, there is still a widespread nationalist rhetoric, and although direct armed conflicts are missing, the psychological conflict is still ongoing. Many researchers have been conducting their studies in these post-conflict communities. However, the samples of most research were people from the territories that were open battlefields (e.g., Čorkalo Biruški & Ajduković, 2012, 2008, in Croatia, Majstorović & Turjačanin, 2013; Turjačanin, 2004; Čehajić-Clancy, 2015, 2012 in B&H). Less is known, compared to Croatia and B&H, about how these wars affected people in Serbia, and what consequences they had for their national identities and relationships toward other groups. There are studies about the social distance, prejudice and stereotypes of other nations, including the nations from the former Yugoslav countries (e.g., Biro, Mihić, Milin, & Logar, 2002; Turjačanin, 2007), but not many have dealt with the question of the Serbian national identity faced with the wars in 1990s. In our study, we would like to explore the stereotypes of young people from Serbia, born during the conflicts in 1990s, in the light of the stimuli created out of collective memories of Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks. Also, we aim to see whether these stimuli provoke differences in social distance and national identity expressions.

We have used a quasi-experimental approach developed by Lobato, Moya, and Trujillo (2015), but instead of presenting a fictional news article as a stimulus, we have used collective memory stimuli. Collective memory has been widely studied since the work of Halbwachs (1950), and is considered to be the social reality of a group. It is a highly subjective concept, with only one perspective, and with no space for ambiguity about motives and events (Novick, 1999; Wagoner, 2014; Wertsch, 2007, 2008). However, it is considered to be true and valid (Bartol, 2014). It is usually a result of markedly positive and more often negative unexpected or extraordinary events that become a basis for the collective memory creation (Wagner, Kronberger, & Seifert, 2002). Also, it helps to strengthen the confidence in the accuracy of our memories, given that our memories can be additionally founded on the memories of others (Halbwachs, 2005).

Collective memory is considered to have several functions. First, collective memory provides continuity of a group and largely affects their present, a characteristic Wertsch (2007) marked as a historical or antihistorical. Today's group identity is linked to a tradition, and common values represented in their shared memory (Bellelli, Curci, & Leone, 2007). Different groups see shared historical events differently, according to their interests and the present, that is, it as a control system which dictates what *should* instead of what *can* be remembered (Schwartz, Fukuoka, & Takita-Ishii, 2005). Second, collective memories have the power to evoke emotions and bring people to action (Bar-Tal, 2014; Collins, 2004; Olick & Robbins, 1998), but they also serve as a base for justifying and legitimizing political actions (Liu & Hilton, 2005; Malinowski, 1926). Third, collective memory can serve as a basepoint for building and reinforcing a group identity (Liu & Hilton, 2005; Rosa, Bellelli, & Bakhurst, 2000, being the construct material or a feature of collective identity (Anderson, 1991; Gavriely-Nuri, 2013).

Collective memories could be *ethnicized* in the way of becoming ethnically exclusive, and providing different meanings of shared events of two national groups (Čorkalo, Ajduković, Weinstein, Stover, Djipa, & Biro, 2004), each of them having their psychological reality which, in our case, clash one against the other. Collective memories of groups, such as Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs in B&H and Croatia, who share the same history of events, look as completely different stories, because they are in function of fulfilling goals and needs of the rival societies (Winter, 2010). The collective memories that would be used as 'short stories stimuli' were collected and analyzed by Ruiz Jiménez (2013) during the late 1990s and early 2000s. The stories were collected by interviews with Serbs, Bosniaks, Bosnian Serbs, Croats, Bosnian Croats, university professors and students, employed and retired people of all three ethnicities in all three countries. The data also included testimonies and the analysis of bibliography from that period. A total of 177 people were interviewed, and the conflicted memories were summarized. In our research, we used the shortened versions as stimuli (Appendix A), that included all the elements of what Bar-Tal (2014) named as *collective master narrative*, which describe the causes of the conflicts, its nature, major events, the images of the enemies, and the ingroup (the ingroup is moralized, and the outgroup is delegitimized), providing the attribution of responsibility for the eruption and continuation of the conflicts, and the misdeeds committed during the conflicts (every side blamed the other side, and stressed negative characteristics). Every memory was full of *major events* which provided the repertoire of emotions, beliefs, and attitudes, as well as the prism for understanding today's reality and behavioural framework (Bar-Tal, 2014).

Most of the research in the region have shown that stereotypes of Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks depend largely on the proximity of conflicts among these three national groups. Studies conducted in the 1990s and at the beginning of 2000s showed that all three nations were described (by the other two) usually in negative terms (for example see Petrović, 2003; Popadić & Biro, 1999; Turjačanin, 2004). Beside negative stereotypes in the 1990s, more recent studies have distin-

guished some positive characteristics attributed to Croats (see Mihić, Varga, Surla, & Karan, 2016; Puhalo, 2012; Turjačanin, 2007). The reason for somewhat more positive stereotyping lies in the smaller extent of the conflicts and constitution of peace, opening boundaries and normalizing economic relations between Serbia and Croatia (Milošević, 2004).

The aim of our research was to examine the evaluations of stereotypical characteristics and their number provoked by the collective memory stimuli. The target group was young Serbs residing in Serbia, who were asked to describe members of other national groups included in the wars in ex-Yugoslavia in 1990s (Bosniaks, Croats, as well as autostereotypes). The national identity and social distance towards the mentioned groups were measured taking into account the experimental manipulation. It was expected from the social distance to grow when the participants were faced with the stimuli. Presenting the 'stories' of Croats or Bosniaks. When it comes to the national identity, we expected that those with more highly expressed national identity would evaluate the other two groups in more negative terms, especially taken into account the manipulation, when the most negative stereotypes were present when participants read 'the other two' stories.

Method

Sample

The sample included 66 young people of Serbian ethnicity, born between 1991 and 1995, who were currently residing in Serbia. Although the questionnaire was disseminated online by using Qualtrics software, and 274 participants stated the survey, there were only as much as 66 valid and complete responses. The discussion could be made about the possible reasons, including the length of the survey or its complexity. It could also be due to the lack of controlled data gathering conditions (the survey was disseminated via Internet by using a snowball method). Out of 66 participants, 21 (31.8%) of them were male, and the rest ($n= 45$, 68.2%) were female. Table 1 illustrates group configuration concerning the year they were born.

Table 1
Frequency and percentage of participants regarding the year of birth

Year of birth	Frequency	Percent
1991	18	27.3
1992	18	27.3
1993	13	19.7
1994	12	18.2
1995	5	7.6

Regarding education level, 4.5% of the sample has only completed high-school, 62.1% has not completed a faculty yet, and 33.3% has a faculty degree. Most of the participants were born in Serbia (83.3%), while some little percentage ($n = 4$, 6.1%) was born in Croatia and B&H, while 3 participants (4.5%) were born in some other country. All of them are currently residing in Serbia. Most of them live in a city (75.8%, $n=50$), while the rest is divided between a village and a town ($n = 8$, 12.1% in each).

Out of the whole sample, approximately one fifth of them (21.2%) lived in a war engaged territory during the wars or has fled from there (19.7%). More than a half of them (62.1%) had a parent or a close cousin fighting in the war, 12 participants (18.2%) lost someone in the war, and 15.2% of them have a parent or a close cousin who has suffered physical or psychological consequences due to the war engagement.

Instruments and procedure

We used a quasi-experimental approach developed by Lobato, Moya, and Trujillo (2015). The flow is shown in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Experimental flow.

First, the introduction was made containing information about the research. The research was described as the assessment of the level of information posses-

sion of young Serbs born between 1991 and 1995 about the wars in the 1990s, and their attitudes towards the nations included. The anonymity and a scientific purpose of the research was guaranteed. Then, socio-demographic data was gathered including the year of birth, nationality, the country of birth, the level of education and residency information. Also, the participants were to respond how familiar they were with the pre-war, war and post-war events on a scale from 1 (*not familiar at all*) to 7 (*completely familiar*). The next step of the survey included the quasi-experimental stimuli in the form of either a Serbian, Croatian or Bosniak collective memory or the control condition. The three experimental stimuli included collective memories adapted from Ruiz Jimenez "The Shadows of Barbarity. Confronting collective memories in republics of former Yugoslavia" (2013). The adaptation was made in order to shorten originally long descriptions of collective memories in order to provide for stimuli that would not demotivate the participants to continue with the survey. The three authors agreed on short versions of the stimuli (Appendix A), which included the most important parts of the original memories, in the same words. The control condition included a displayed sentence on the screen: "Please read the instructions carefully before filling the rest of the survey". After the stimuli were presented, participants were to state a percentage in which they believed that the presented information were true (the percentage of memory certainty). The number and percentage of participants in each experimental condition and the control condition are presented in Table 2. As it could be seen, regardless of the small number of participants, they are more or less evenly distributed across conditions.

Table 2

Number and percentage of participants in each experimental and control condition

Condition	Frequency	Percent
Serbian collective memory stimulus	17	22.7
Croatian collective memory stimulus	16	25.8
Bosniak collective memory stimulus	18	24.2
Control condition	15	22.7

The following assessed was the content of prejudice towards different national groups. Participants were asked to state up to five characteristics of Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks, write a percentage in which they thought members of each group shared that characteristic, and evaluate each characteristic on a 7-point scale ranging from -3 = *extremely negative* to +3 = *extremely positive*. They were to do the same thing for each of the three national groups, and the groups were offered in a randomized manner.

Social Distance Scale (Bogardus, 1926). The Social Distance Scale included the following set of social relations: marriage, friendship, a co-worker in the same office, a neighbor, a co-habitant in your city, and the engagement in the political scene of your country. Participants are to mark whether they would oppose having each of these relationships with the members of each national group. The social distance score is calculated as a count of all "Yes, I do mind." responses for each national group, in a way that higher scores present a higher social distance.

National Identity Scale (Cinnirella, 1997). A 7-item scale based on the Social Identity Theory, which measures identification with the national group was presented to the participants. Every item has a 5-point Likert type response scale (e.g., "How close do you feel to the members of your nation?", "How similar do you think you are to the members of your nation?"). Responses are coded so that a higher score indicates higher national identity ($\alpha = .88$).

The last part of the design included more socio-demographic questions regarding a direct war experience, such as whether a person lived in a war engaged territory during the wars, whether his/her family fled from those territories, did any of the parents or close relatives participate in the wars, died or have lasting consequences due to direct involvement in the war. These questions were presented at the end purposefully, so the eventual priming would be avoided and presented in a more detailed manner in the sample section.

Results

Descriptive statistics

Percentage of certainty that the memories are true. First, the average percentage of certainty for each experimental condition memory stimulus was calculated, and ANOVA was applied (Table 3). There was a significant difference in the percentage of certainty of the memories regarding experimental conditions ($F(2, 48) = 4.70, p < .05$). Scheffe post-hoc analysis showed that the only significant difference was between Serbian and Croatian memory conditions.

Table 3
Percent of certainty of credibility of presented memories

Condition	Percent
Serbian collective memory	67.82
Croatian collective memory	38.94
Bosniak collective memory	53.83

Frequency of characteristics. All the characteristics were examined, while answers that did not present any characteristic or were unclear were removed

(e.g., unemployed, aware of the Western impact). There were 270 characteristics extracted in total, and after merging the synonyms (e.g. welcoming and hospitable, in Serbian *gostoljubiv* and *gostoprимljiv*), a total of 233 different characteristics were extracted, which were used to describe all three groups. Then these characteristics were coded into higher order categories taken from Lobato, Moya, and Trujillo (2015): personality, education, politics, ideology, religion, and conflict (Table 4).

Table 4
Number of characteristics in each category in all conditions

	Sum CC*	Sum SM	Sum CM	Sum BM	Sum
Personality	167	137	123	135	562
Education	6	11	5	6	28
Politics	0	6	1	0	7
Ideology	20	15	16	23	74
Religion	1	5	1	7	14
Conflict	1	6	1	1	9
Sum	195	180	147	172	694

Note. *CC = control condition; SM = Serbian memory condition; CM = Croatian memory condition; BM = Bosniak memory condition.

Table 5 demonstrates the number of characteristics stated in all conditions for each national group.

Table 5
Number of characteristics for each national group in all conditions

	Serbs	Croats	Bosniaks
Control condition	73	64	58
Serbian memory condition	67	55	58
Croatian memory condition	53	53	41
Bosniak memory condition	72	50	50
Sum	265	222	207

When it comes to changes across conditions, Figure 2 shows how the number of characteristics in each category changes with experimental conditions. As it could be noted, in the control condition most of the characteristics fall into the

category of personality, and somewhat ideology and education. As conditions change, the number of categories other than these fluctuates, indicating that the stimuli do provoke changes in the characteristics produced at some low level. Chi-square tests could not be applied due to the disproportionate or rather small number of characteristics in some categories (see Table 5).




Figure 2. A number of characteristics in each category in all conditions.

Evaluation of national groups

The favourability index was calculated (Rodríguez-Bailón & Moya, 1998), having in mind negative (evaluated with -3, -2, and -1) and positive characteristics (evaluated with 1, 2 and 3) in the following manner: Favourability index = N of positive characteristics / (N of positive + N of negative characteristics). The favourability index for evaluating Serbs was 0.53, for evaluating Croats was 0.38, and for evaluating Bosniaks was 0.56, indicating that more characteristics were evaluated positive than negative when it came to Serbs and Bosniaks, but more characteristics were negative when it came to Croats. There were no significant differences in the favourability index across conditions ($F_{\text{Croats}}(3,51) = 1.03, p > .05$, $F_{\text{Bosniaks}}(3,47) = 0.58, p > .05$, $F_{\text{Serbs}}(3,38) = 1.62, p > .05$).

There was no statistically significant difference in the number of characteristics in each evaluation category across conditions except in the case of positive characteristics count in Bosniaks ($F(3, 62) = 2.93, p < .05$), when presented with the Croatian memory stimulus ($M = 1.06, SD = 1.69$), compared to the control condition ($M = 2.67, SD = 1.68$). However, as Figure 3 shows, there were tendencies to evaluate Croats in more negative terms (as well indicated by the favourability index).




Figure 3. Total frequency and percentage of characteristics by evaluation categories across the national groups.

Figure 4 demonstrates the number of positive, neutral, and negative characteristics for each national group across conditions, while Table 6 shows comparisons in a number of characteristics regarding evaluation in each experimental condition. In Serbian memory condition, Croats were described in more negative terms than Serbs or Bosniaks. Also when the stimulus was Croatian memory, they were described with fewer negative characteristics than Bosniaks. When it came to positive characteristics, significantly more were related to Serbs than to Croats and Bosniaks in Serbian memory condition, with Croats being almost constantly described in the fewest number of positive terms.




Figure 4. Number of positive, neutral, and negative characteristics across conditions and national groups.

Table 6

Results of χ^2 tests for comparing the number of negative and positive characteristics across conditions

Negative characteristics						
Control condition			Serbian memory stimulus			
	S vs. C	S vs. B	B vs. C	S vs. C	S vs. B	B vs. C
χ^2	14.65	12.75	16.71	37.44**	29.92	48.34**
<i>df</i>	16	12	12	20	20	25
Croatian memory stimulus			Bosniak memory stimulus			
	S vs. C	S vs. B	B vs. C	S vs. C	S vs. B	B vs. C
χ^2	29,97	23,49	35,00*	19,98	17,86	12,49
<i>df</i>	20	16	20	15	15	9
Positive characteristics						
Control condition			Serbian memory stimulus			
	S vs. C	S vs. B	B vs. C	S vs. C	S vs. B	B vs. C
χ^2	24.04	32.73	22.79	34.40*	37.68*	37.52*
<i>df</i>	20	25	20	20	25	20

Table 6 (continued)

	Croatian memory stimulus			Bosniak memory stimulus		
	S vs. C	S vs. B	B vs. C	S vs. C	S vs. B	B vs. C
χ^2	17.95	28.67*	21.56*	28.25*	23.63	19.88
df	12	16	12	16	16	16

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

Social distance

As systematically reported throughout previous research, the social distance towards the ingroup was the least expressed, with the average social distance on our sample towards Croats being 6.67, towards Bosniaks 5.57 and Serbs 2.83. There were significant differences between every two groups (Table 7).

Table 7

Differences in social distance towards different national groups as shown by t-test for paired samples

National group pairs	t ($df = 65$)	p
Croats vs. Bosniaks	2.18	.033
Croats vs. Serbs	5.24	.000
Bosniaks vs. Serbs	3.91	.000

The percentage of not accepted relationships is shown in Table 8. It could be seen that the participants in our sample would not mind being a friend or a colleague with the members of the other two ethnic groups, but more than a third would not have marriage relationships with them. Also, a certain percentage would mind having them as influencing politicians in Serbia, with less acceptance of a Croat than a Bosniak for this function.

Table 8

Percentage of relationship refusals for each national group

National group	Marriage	Friend	Colleague	Neighbour	Citizen	Politician
Croats	36.36	1.52	1.52	1.52	0	19.70
Bosniaks	33.33	3.03	1.52	1.52	0	12.12
Serbs	15.15	1.52	0	3.03	0	6.06

There were no significant differences in social distance across the three experimental conditions and in the control condition ($F_{\text{Croats}}(3,62) = 0.64, p > .05$,

$F_{\text{Bosniaks}}(3,62) = 0.83, p > .05, F_{\text{Serbs}}(3,62) = 0.53, p > .05$). Correlations between the social distances towards each group were significant and positive (Serbs and Croats $r = .33, p < .01$, Serbs and Bosniaks $r = .36, p < .01$, Croats and Bosniaks $r = .77, p < .001$), indicating the tendency to create higher social distance regardless of the object group.

National identity measure

The average score on National Identity Scale was 20.81 ($SD = 6.12$), which in general indicates a moderate national identification. No significant differences exist across conditions ($F(3,58) = 0.19, p > .05$). There are no significant correlations of the national identity with social distance, nor with the number of characteristics across evaluation categories, except in one case where the national identity and the number of negatively evaluated characteristics of Serbs correlate in a positive manner ($r = .27, p < .05$), with interpretation provided in the discussion.

Discussion

Studies about the relations among Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks during and after the wars in the 1990s have been widely conducted, and these post-conflict societies have provided for an inexhaustible source of data, as it seems. Most of the studies have been conducted including samples from the war engaged territories (Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina), but some studies were discussing the attitudes of people from Serbia towards the three national groups in question (e.g., Mihaljević et al., 2016). The aim of our study was to examine the evaluations of stereotypical characteristics and their number, provoked by the collective memory stimuli in young Serbs towards Bosniaks and Croats, and their relations to social distance and the national identity.

First of all, the young Serbs showed to agree more with the views of the wars in the 1990s linked to their nation's memory, which is an outcome that is statistically significant when it comes to differences in the percentage of certainty, that is, their belief that Croatian and Serbian memory stimuli are true. This result is in accordance with the collective memory studies that show that the members of a group find their collective memory to be more accurate than the one of the other side (e.g., Bar-Tal, 2014; Halbwachs, 1950). When it comes to characteristics listed by the participants, in general, and across conditions, the number of them describing Serbs is the largest, except in the case of Croatian memory, which is in accordance with the social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), which argues that we see the members of our ingroup as more complex and more diverse than the outgroup members. Most of the characteristics fall into the category of personality, thus participants being able to produce much more different attributes than when it comes to other categories. This result could also indicate that per-

sonality characteristics are seen as more important than any other category. As it could be seen on Figure 1, the count of characteristics in each condition somewhat changes, with the control condition having the highest count in total. Ideology and religion categories are mostly used when describing Croats and Bosniaks, with tendencies of growth when Croatian or Bosniak memories are presented as stimuli. Conflict characteristics are almost not listed at all, except in the case of Serbian memory stimulus, where a certain, but rather small number of these characteristics is attributed to the two outgroups. All these observations are made on a very small sample, and should therefore be very carefully taken into consideration.

The content of characteristics is important (and due to the extent of data will be addressed in another article), however, what is at least equally important is the evaluation given to each of them, considering that the same characteristic could be evaluated as positive, negative or neutral, depending on its holder. The favourability index indicates that the characteristics used to describe Serbs and Bosniaks are evaluated more positively than negatively, while with Croats it is not the case. At this point, it could be assumed that our sample participants' stereotypes about Croats are rather negative, regardless of the context (the stimuli presented), since this proportion of positive and negative evaluations does not change across conditions. This could also be noted on Figure 2, where proportions of all positive, neutral and negative characteristics are presented, indicating that indeed the percentage of negative evaluations for Croats differs by almost 13 percent in comparison to both other groups (49.57 compared to 37.17 and 36.45, respectively). Bosniaks are the group that is evaluated in most positive terms, which is a certain novelty for the research of stereotypes towards them (see Petrović, 2003; Turjačanin, 2004, 2007). Significantly higher number of positive evaluations of Bosniaks is found when Croatian memory stimulus is presented, thus opening the question of how our participants see the relationship between these two nations.

Comparisons of the numbers of positive and negative evaluations across conditions show that, there is a significant difference in Serbian memory condition in the number of negative evaluations between Serbs and Croats, and Bosniaks and Croats, such that the Croats are evaluated in more negative terms than both Serbs and Bosniaks. In Croatian memory condition, the difference in numbers is even bigger between Croats and Bosniaks. Also, Croats are described with significantly less positive characteristics than both Serbs and Bosniaks in the Serbian memory condition, and Serbs in Bosniak memory condition. Taken altogether with previous descriptions, these results point once again that Croats are evaluated in the most negative terms of all three groups, even more negative than Bosniaks, when the latter are not even in the story. Also, although the stereotype towards Bosniaks is more positive than the one towards Croats, our participants describe their ingroup in significantly more positive characteristics, when presented with the Serbian or Croatian memory, that way favouring the ingroup, as the social identity theory would easily explain.

Results on the Social Distance Scale indicate that the lack of differences in social distance regarding experimental conditions could point to the social distance being determined by a person rather than a situation, indicating that there are people who tend to have higher social distance in general, regardless of the group in question. This could also be the case due to the lack of the effect of the experimental manipulation, bringing up once again the question, as indicated earlier, whether the manipulation was salient enough, or whether the right stimuli were chosen. However, the correlation between social distance towards Croats and Bosniaks, compared to the correlations towards Serbs and each of the two groups, is much higher, indicating that if our participants are prone to distance themselves from one outgroup, they are more prone to do the same with the other outgroup. The structure of social distancing is somewhat similar between distancing from Croats and Bosniaks, with the percentage of the refused partnership and political involvement of the Croats being somewhat higher. Although the social distance towards the three national groups does not differ significantly across conditions, in general there are significant differences between all three national groups, where the ingroup social distance is the least expressed, with the social distance towards Bosniaks and Croats following. Marriage/partner relationships are most likely to be refused by the participants in our sample, in such a way that they would least likely marry a Croat, then a Bosniak, and then a Serb. Also, when it comes to the political engagement in their country, they would mind a Croat being an influencing politician more than a Bosniak or a Serb. These results are somewhat different than those found in some other social distance studies (e.g., Kandido-Jakšić, 2008; Čorkalo & Kamenov, 2003), where the percentage of acceptance of marriage with Croats and Bosniaks is much lower than in our sample (for example, in our sample 64% of participants would accept marriage with a Croat, and 67% of them would accept a marriage with a Bosniak, compared to 49% and 36% respectively in Biro et al., 2002).

The average score on the National Identity Scale was 20.81, which is similar to those obtained in other studies, for example in Vojvodina 21.10 (Mihić, 2006), Novi Sad 25.01 (Kamenov, Jelić, Huić, Franceško, & Mihić, 2006), and Serbia 20.34 (Jelić, Kamenov, Mihić, Bodroža, & Jelić, 2017). The previous research elsewhere, including other nationalities, has shown that, when measured by this scale, the national identity statistic is a little higher than the average (Cinnirella, 1997; Kamenov et al., 2006). When it comes to the national identity, there are no significant differences across conditions, which could point that the presented stimuli are not such an important variable as expected. The one significant finding, that there is a positive correlation between the national identity and the number of negatively evaluated characteristics of the ingroup, is rather interesting, and could be explained taking into account the measure. The National Identity Scale used in this research does not measure nationalism, but rather a critical attachment to one's nation, hence indicating that those who have higher national identity would be less fond of their ingroup, or at least more objective, when the ingroup is pre-

sented in a negative or a questionable manner, which engagement in a war certainly is.

As our results indicate, collective memory as narrated by the interviewees of Ruiz Jiménez is not such an important factor when talking about relations with Croats and Bosniaks in our sample. It could be that the narrative as it would be described by the young in Serbia now is different than the one of the previous generation, and hence it does not have much impact on their distancing from the other two nations. The image of Croats remains the most negative, and the social distance is the largest towards this national group. However, improvements have been recorded in comparison to other studies in the last 15 years, although we remind to bear in mind the size and other characteristics of the sample (gender and educational misbalance, as well as its convenience). Future research should try to solve the methodological issues of the sampling, while the data about personality characteristics, which are listed at large, should be further analyzed.

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STEREOTIPI MLADIH U SRBIJI O HRVATIMA I BOŠNJACIMA PROVOCIRANI STIMULUSIMA KOLEKTIVNOG SEĆANJA

Ratovi na prostoru bivše SFRJ tokom devedesetih godina ostali su zapamćeni među najkrvavijim sukobima u novijoj istoriji. Kao jednu od posledica ostavili su tri etničke grupe, Bošnjake, Hrvate i Srbe, u trajnom psihološkom konfliktu, naročito na području dveju država na kojima su se ratna dejstva odvijala direktno. U godinama posle ratova mnogobrojne studije bavile su se pitanjem odnosa između tri etničke grupe, ali ne veliki broj njih je ispitivao stereotipe pripadnika srpske etničke grupe koji žive u Srbiji, koja je bila jedan od aktera rata, ali se na njenoj teritoriji nisu odvijala ratna dejstva. Cilj našeg istraživanja bio je ispitati kakvi se stereotipi Bošnjaka i Hrvata javljaju kod mladih Srba iz Srbije u odnosu na konflikte devedesetih. Kao stimuluse u kvaziekperimentalnom pristupu koristili smo skraćene verzije kolektivnih sećanja Srba, Hrvata i Bošnjaka kako su ona opisana kod Ruiz Himenesa (Ruiz Jiménez, 2013), sa ciljem pozivanja na referentni kontekst. Uzorak u istraživanju činilo je 66 mladih rođenih između 1991. i 1995. godine koji žive u Srbiji. Baterija instrumenata uključila je Skalu nacionalnog identiteta, Skalu socijalne distance, socio-demografski upitnik i set stimulusa praćen pitanjima koja su se odnosila na osobine koje bi učesnici pripisali svakoj od etničkih grupa. Rezultati su pokazali da eksperimentalni uslovi nisu imali bitnog uticaja na opisane stereotipe, kao ni na nacionalni identitet ili izraženost socijalne distance. Ipak, učesnici u našem istraživanju dosledno su evaluirali osobine pripisane Hrvatima kao negativnije u odnosu na one pripisane Bošnjacima ili pripadnicima svoje grupe i dodeljivan im je manji broj pozitivnih osobina nego drugim dvema grupama. Najveći broj navedenih osobina pripada kategoriji ličnosti, što ukazuje na atribuiranje stereotipne slike unutrašnjim i stabilnim činiocima naspram spoljnih i dinamičkih. Kada je u pitanju socijalna distanca, u našem istraživanju je ona manje izražena nego u istraživanjima sprovedenim u regionu u poslednjih petnaestak godina, sa najmanjim stepenom prihvatanja partnerskog odnosa sa pripadnicima najpre hrvatske, a zatim i bošnjačke etničke grupe. Ispitanici su takođe u određenom stepenu izrazili socijalnu distancu prema tome da pripadnik hrvatske, odnosno bošnjačke etničke grupe bude uticajan političar u Srbiji. Nacionalni identitet nije značajno korelirao sa evaluativnim aspektom stereotipa niti socijalnom distancom, ali je jedan značajan odnos pokazao da su Srbi sa izraženijim nacionalnim identitetom skloniji pridavanju negativnih osobina pripadnicima sopstvene grupe, što može biti odraz kritičkog sagledavanja svoje grupe.

Ključne reči: stereotipi, kolektivno sećanje, socijalna distanca, nacionalni identitet

Appendix A

Collective memory stimuli presented in the study

Long versions

Serbs. After the defeat in the battle on Kosovo and five centuries of submission to Islam, in 1878 Serbia gained its independence, which was interrupted only once during the German occupation from 1941 to 1945. After WW2, Tito proclaimed brotherhood and unity among Yugoslavian people, and Serbia is forced to forgive pro-Nazi politics of the NDH (e.g. Jasenovac). In the Communist Yugoslavia, only in Serbia there were no national songs sang in order to avoid offending other peoples' feelings, although the other nations accused it of being privileged. Anyhow, Serbia was endangered, because part of its population lived in B&H and Croatia, and the Autonomous Provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo had their own governments that had a veto right on Serbia's decisions, while Serbia did not have veto on their decisions. Considering the fact that Serbia was the only one to shed blood during the defence from the Nazis, and that it generously accepted Croatian and Albanian dissidents, there was an imbalance between the number of its inhabitants and the portion in the federal government. Serbia was growing weaker under Yugoslavism, and when Slobodan Milošević emerged declaring at the celebration of 600 years of the Battle of Kosovo that the Serbs would fight Muslims again if necessary, the national pride and mood raised. Milošević abolished the autonomous status to Kosovo and Vojvodina, and by that, he started getting back under the wing of Serbia the regions that were going down the way of separatism.

The independency conflicts in Slovenia and Croatia at the beginning of the 1990s posed a direct threat to Serbia, considering that it was the only one having its people scattered in Croatia, B&H and Kosovo. Slovenia had always had pretty much homogenized population and a different language, so it was not a threat for the breakdown of the SFRY, while the turmoil in Croatia destabilized SFRY. Croatian population had higher living standard than Serbian, and they wrongfully felt discriminated due to the illusory favouring of Serbs compared to Croats, when it came to jobs in Croatia. However, it was about favouring the citizens of lower socio-economic status, which were more represented among Serbs than among Croats. The new constitution abolished the status of the constitutive nation to Serbs in Croatia, and they are converted into ordinary foreigners. The expected consequences were Serbs leaving Croatia, and hiring Croats in their work places. Serbs had to give up their nationalities, or they would wrongfully be declared incompetent for working in the Croatian public sector. In Serbian enclaves, these events were a clear sign of the comeback of Ustashas, which created a discriminatory and nationalist country once more, although Serbs forgave them crimes from WW2 for the sake of brotherhood and unity. In order to prevent the WW2 episodes, the Serbs started the Territorial Defence Plan (TDF) in their communities, and the Yugoslav National Army (YNA) came to help endangered Serbian people.

The most of Croatian soldiers had already left YNA, and following the model of TDF, established their own national guard. Krajina Serbs declared the Republic of Srpska Krajina in Croatia. However, the international community acknowledged the independence of Croatia, but not the independence of Krajina. In 1993, due to the pressure of the international community which considered the YNA operations aggression against the country that had declared its independence, and due to the agreement between Milošević and Tuđman, YNA got the order to withdraw. Withdrawing caused the confusion among the Serbs from that region, as well as among the very members of YNA, who felt as they betrayed Serbian people and left they unprotected. In the summer of 1995, Croatian military offensive called 'The Storm', which was logistically supported by the USA, broke down the defence of Croatian Serbs, and caused a mass exodus that enabled ethnic cleansing and definitely put a stop to Serbian minority in Croatia.

B&H was an area historically inhabited by Serbs, and it got the status of a republic only in 1945, while until then it was just a geographical determinant. After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, most of the natives that converted to Islam remained to live in that area, and there were no conflicts until 1992. Before the danger of declaring independence of B&H in 1992, in which Muslims were a majority, the Serbian community rebelled considering unacceptable to become a minority again in a Muslim country, under Turks who humiliated them in the past, and under the governance of a radical Islamist Alija Izetbegović. After Izetbegović declared the independence of B&H in 1992, the international community did not acknowledge the new state, hence the Serbs from B&H, led by the politics of Radovan Karadžić, decided to create a Serbian state free of the Muslim control. The war began with the first victim, a Serb Nikola Gardović, who was shot dead on his son's wedding day by a radical Islamist Ramiz Delačić, who later became the commander of the Bosnian Brigade Army. Afterwards, 50 young YNA soldiers of all nationalities were killed in a convoy that was peacefully leaving Tuzla in May 1992. The international press took the Muslim community's side and presented Muslims as victims. The siege of Sarajevo and the bomb thrown at the local market were attempts to extort the NATO intervention against Serbs, which was proven true by the independent investigation which said that the Muslim government sacrificed a few of their members. Also, the construed image that was in the media at the time was the image of Serbian savages that cold bloodedly massacred thousands of innocents in Srebrenica, and little was said about the troops of Naser Orić, who was relentlessly and continuously attacking Serbian villages around Srebrenica.

Naser Orić was set free after the symbolic detention in The Hague, and returned to B&H, where he was celebrated as a hero. The decennial of the Srebrenica massacre gave the opportunity to Serbs to see a documentary called 'The Truth', in which it was shown that the Serbs were actually the victims of the conflict. A few days earlier, a Belgrade daily published a 16-pages annex called 'The Book of dead', with the list of more than 3,000 Serbs from the region of Srebrenica that lost lives in the war. The recognition of the crimes committed against Serbs has still

not happened. The Committee for Serbian ex-Yu wars victims has never agreed with the official number of Bosnian victims in Srebrenica, which were recognized by the international community. In July 2005, the day after the memorial to the fallen in Srebrenica, which was visited by numerous representatives of the international community, and which was extremely covered by the media from all over the world, a similar memorial was held in nearby Kravice, dedicated to Serbian victims from that area. Inexplicable, but the international community did not pay attention to the Serbs killed by the Croatian soldiers in Krajina and East Slavonia, where there were hundreds of dead, while the number of the displaced reached a quarter of a million. Due to all aforementioned, the Serbs were the greatest victims of those wars: violently displaced from Croatia, forced to leave the Western B&H, and to fight to stay in the east, and not fall under the governance of Muslim nationalists, marked as the aggressor state in Slovenia and Croatia, and as a genocide committer in Bosnia, castigated by the Haag tribunal.

Croats. There is a history of the national liberation from various peoples who were historically conquering the Croats. After many decades under the governance of Austro-Hungary, the peace agreements after the WW1 forced Croatia to enter the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians. This country was designed abroad, according to the criteria of the USA president Woodrow Wilson. However, many Croats saw the new state as the possibility to create a country that would be in brotherly relations with all Slavic peoples in the Balkans, which was a long-lasting aspiration of the intellectuals from that region. In the first Yugoslavia (1918-1941), Croatia quickly became discriminated and disappointed because of the centralism of Serbian kings. As an example of an unequal division of duties among the three constitutive nations of this young state, it was enough to state that out of 116 generals in the army there were only 5 Croats and 1 Slovenian. The Croatia people's party (HSS) consistently reported the abuse of governance. In 1928, its complaints lead to a dispute in which Serbian-Montenegrin MP Punisa Racic shot towards Croatian benches during the parliament seating. Two MPs died instantly, three were shot, and among whom there was Stjepan Radic, the leader of the HSS, who did not survive. Racic was sentenced only to house arrest, and set free later on. Soon the dictatorship was established that revealed the true despot nature of Yugoslavia and which sharpened the conjoint lives of the ethnic groups.

During WW2, under the governance of Ante Pavelic, Croatia allied s with the Axis powers. The paramilitary forces called the Ustashas, which became uncontrollable by the new regular army, took vengeance actions against Serbs who had been acting as the lords of the country. The defeat of Germany brought the governance to the Communist partisan gorillas who used the situation to rob the houses of Croatian civilians, into which they would often move in, while the original owners served them. Also, they revenged unpunishable and mercilessly for the actions of the Ustashas, and to such extremes as there was the massacre in Bleiberg in 1945. Many Croatian civilians and soldiers fled to Austria in order to surrender to the British army from which they expected a milder treatment. However, the

British army turned the immigrants in the hands of partisans. Those who were not killed at sight took a road known as the Croatia via crucis, the road home on foot or, in some cases, the road to concentration camps. This immigrant escape attempt ended in genocide. Some historians talk about the number of 65,000 dead among the immigrants from Bleiberg.

Within SFRY, the parliament seats were monopolized in the favour of Serbia. Also, it was forbidden to put up the Croatian flag and sing their patriotic songs. At the same time, the existence of their language was brought in question, since it was merged into Serbo-Croatian, in which Serbian was taken for the accurate form, and Croatian was considered a dialect. The politics of industrialization of the underdeveloped republics (Kosovo, B&H and Montenegro) was a way to deprive Croatia and Slovenia of their economic bases.

After the turmoil caused by the fuel crisis in 1973, and after the failure of the real communism between 1989 and 1991, and by realising, as it could be foreseen, that it would have a more difficult access to the EU if it continued being a communist country, Croatia finally stopped identifying with the Yugoslavian idea. When Serbia abolished the autonomous status to Kosovo and Vojvodina, which was followed by repressive measures in the case of Kosovo, Croatian fears raised that SFRY would be just a curtain for Serbian hegemonistic politics to her neighbours. Due to all that, both Croatia and Slovenia decided to throw off the economic ballast, and gain total political independence on the road, which would set them free from the Serbian tutorship.

The 1974 Constitution envisaged that every republic of the federation, if it wanted, had the right to secede, hence the independence referendum was conducted completely legally. When Croatia declared independence, Serbian army besieged and shelled enclaves (such as Dubrovnik and Vukovar), which confirmed that Serbia was an enemy as it had always been, since the time of the Chetniks. However, Croatian president Franjo Tuđman promised to Serbs in Croatia a normal life if they reside from their separatism in Krajina and give back the territories to the Croatian government (which they were given centuries earlier to work and live on them until the Ottomans leave, but after the Ottomans left, they decided to stay and take over the territory). As a consequence of Krajina Serbs' refusal to accept Tuđman's terms, supported by the entire international community, a liberating military action 'The Storm' was conducted with the least possible loss, placing the guarantees that peaceful Serbs who wanted could have stayed on the territory.

Bosniaks. After disappearance of the Ottoman governance in the Balkans, the residents of B&H, mostly Muslims, remained in the territory that only a few years later became the Austro-Hungarian province, and then a part of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenians. During WW2, it was a stage for the biggest military operations, and it became one of the republics of the SFRY after the war. At the 1990 elections, the party of Alija Izetbegovic won. At that moment, facing the possibility of declaring independence of B&H, in which the Muslims

were the majority, Serbian community from the north rebelled, considering unacceptable to become a minority again in their own country. The government was convinced that the international community would acknowledge the independence of the young state, fought over the elections, as it was the case months earlier with Slovenia and Croatia. Surprisingly, not a single foreign force moved a finger. That was why both Croats and Serbs started thinking not only about spreading their territories at the cost of ripping off parts of B&H, by dividing it between themselves, but the chance to practically unite all Serbs and Croats in their two enlarged states in which Muslims would be a minority, instead of a less favourable option of a space in which thousands of people would live in a Muslim country.

After the independence referendum, Serbs fulfilled their threats that they would boycott the parliament, and that they would unilaterally declare the independence of their region, led by the politics of Radovan Karadzic, while Croats did the same under the leadership of Mato Boban. These two arranged a division on a meeting held in Graz, Austria. The tension reached its peak on March 2nd 1992 when, an orthodox priest Nikola Gardovic waved Serbian flag in the streets in the centre of Sarajevo yelling "This is Serbia!" on his son's wedding day. This hasty reaction cost him his life. Serbian soldiers opened fire on the 5th of April to a peace march in Sarajevo. Considering the fact that it could not hold Croatia in Yugoslavia, Serbia was ready to activate military forces in order to rule Bosnia. Something similar was desired by the Croats in Herzegovina. This meant that certain parts of B&H would be annexed to Serbia, or Croatia respectively, completely ignoring the will of the most numerous ethnic group: Bosnian Muslims. As in B&H there were no ethnically clean territories, the strategy was to start a merciless action of ethnic cleansing of local Muslim residents. The dirty job of killing civilians was given to paramilitary formations, among which the most famous were Arkan's Tigers, Hawks or White Eagles. These groups were well equipped with weapons that YNA left to them during their withdrawal. In the first phases of war, Croats and Muslims cooperated against the Serbian enemy. However, the cooperation was interrupted when the UN plan, known as Vance-Owen plan, hit the light of the day, since it suggested that the country should be divided into three ethnic enclaves, one for each nation. Since that moment, encouraged by this proposal, Izetbegovic's Bosniaks and Boban's Bosnian Croats started fighting between themselves for the territories under their control, which caused even bigger bloodshed and intensified the ethnic cleansing. That way, Bosnian Muslims were between two fires, repressed, the victims of weapon embargo that hit only them, considering the obvious help Serbia and Croatia provided to their allies in B&H. Muslims were left with no guns or allies. That was how their tragedy began, as they were helpless before the wave of mass rapes, ethnic cleansing and siege, with late and insufficient cooperation of the Western forces. Mostar, which was under siege, shelled by the YNA had to enter the war again after retreat of YNA, this time with Croats who tried to take it over in blood and flames. Serbian grenade that killed dozens of civilians who were trying to get some food in the city centre, was just the top of the

iceberg of suffering. However, with no doubt, the worst atrocities were in Srebrenica, in which Serbian parasoldiers, committed a genocide under the command of Ratko Mladic, by killing cold-bloodedly more than 8,000 unarmed civilians.

These traumas lead to the empowerment of the Muslim characteristics, additionally fuelled by Saudi Arabia and Iran, who were always on their side and gladly financed mosques, language courses of Arabic, and building of Islamic cultural centres, as well as public places related to the Muslim-Ottoman past, as it was the case of the renovation of the bridge in Mostar by the Government of Turkey. Namely, when mujahedeen volunteers arrived from the Near East to fight with their Bosnian brothers in 1993, they were stunned to see religious slouch of some of the Muslims who barely went to mosques and joyfully drank alcohol, while their wives were dressed in a Western way. In the end, Yugoslavia was an advanced socialist country for the half of a century. However, now, the need to affirm again against their political opponents and ex-war enemies with whom they had to share the country, as well as the islamization conditioned by the help of Muslim countries, enlarged the number of mosques, and encouraged to wear the hijab. Political rivalry during the election processes should be added to the cultural distancing, because there were only nationalist options, without a single party that would propose governing with the same right for all three nationalities living in B&H.

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**PUBLIC OPINION IN SERBIA ON ICTY:
A CHICKEN OR AN EGG?**

The paper presents seven consecutive public opinion polls in Serbia (in the period 2000–2011) on the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and its “partiality” towards Serbs. The author connected changes in attitudes of citizens during the observed years with the public statements of the “national leaders” about the Tribunal, as well as with the presentation of the facts of Serbian war crimes in Serbian media. Even though the observed correlation could not be interpreted in the terms of causal relation, the author pointed out to the importance of creators of the public opinion, and offered a possibility that the leading politicians and media in Serbia were not reactive to the attitudes of citizens (as they claimed) but vice versa – they created the public opinion of citizens by their statements or by presentation of the facts about Serbian war crimes.

Keywords: ICTY, public opinion in Serbia

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*Nation is a society that shares
common illusions about its ancestors
and common hatred toward its neighbors.*
Ernest Renan, French philosopher

After 24 years of existence, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) completed its work this year. In its founding charter, the Tribunal was conceived for the purpose to exercise justice for war crimes in the former Yugoslavia, which was presumed to be prerequisite for the process of reconciliation among the nations that were in conflict. However, after several prosecutions, ICTY has provoked anger on all sides of the former Yugoslavia, and in all the newly created states there is a predominantly negative attitude towards the Tribunal (Biro et al., 2004). The victims were unsatisfied with the small sentences compared to the severity of the crimes, and in each of the new republics, there was a public counting of “too many indictments for our nation” with the mandatory attribute of “unfair convictions”, while sentencing the members of other nations was minimized and looked upon as “unfairly small”. For some of the accused for which the conviction was overturned (i.e., Croat Ante Gotovina, Bosniak Naser Orić, Kosovo Albanian Ramush Haradinaj) majority of Serbian population is convinced they are undoubtedly war criminals (Demostat, 2017). On the other side, a similar attitude for Serb Vojislav Šešelj exists among Croats. Moreover, many of the accused military leaders in their countries are portrayed as “war heroes”.

This situation is, no doubt, the result of the previous war propaganda that produced national homogenization. During 90s, in Serbian media, the term “genocidal Croatian people” was customary, while in Croatian media we encounter qualifications of members of Serbian nationality as primitive, aggressive, and having “communist mentality”. Such homogenization, filled with hatred, then created a perception that the people with whom the conflict took place represented collective, undifferentiated entity, not the individuals. Thus, it was easy for politicians to talk about convicted “Serbs”, “Croats” or “Bosniaks” and not about war criminals who have their first and last name.

In accord with the Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Tajfel & Forgas, 2000; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987), the process of social categorization contributes to negative evaluation of out-group members, and characteristic cognitive process – “ultimate attribution error” (Pettigrew, 1979) equalizes all out-group members in their “guilt” and their “bad traits”. A logical consequence of such generalization is, of course, resistance to any idea of reconciliation. The reasoning behind it is: how can we talk about reconciliation with a group which is, without exception, “worthless” and “hostile” and, which is, even more important, experienced as *unchangeable* in these traits of theirs? The stronger the social identity, the less will it allow for recognition of individual differences; it will not permit a possibility that a part of “us” can be war criminals, nor will it permit a possibility that a part of “them” can be worthy of our respect or

sympathy. This can be a simple psychological explanation why fans of their nation cannot grasp the notorious truth that sanctioning one's own war crimes would enable individualization of guilt for these crimes, which could lead to the removal of collective guilt, and, along with that, improvement of the image of the whole nation. However, this tendency to deny the existence of war crimes committed by the members of one's nation is not typical only of the people of the Balkans. After Lieutenant Calley was sentenced for war crimes for his actions in the Vietnam village of My Lai, according to a Gallup poll (Kelman & Hamilton, 1989), some 79% of American citizens were against that sentence and rejected the idea that there were war crimes caused by American soldiers at all.

An additional obstacle to the acceptance of ICTY in general, and in particular as an instrument of reconciliation, was the fact that politicians (on all sides) portrayed the Tribunal's prosecutions as a prosecution of their nation (and not individuals who belonged to that nation) contributing to the collectivization of guilt, instead of individuating the guilt and with that taking the stigma off their nationality. As the American professor of Law, Robert Hayden (1999) wrote: "Local political leaders use particular prosecutions, as well as evidence, as an argument in conflicts with other leaders in the region, and this does not support reconciliation. It has nothing to do with reconciliation. It's ammunition for future political conflicts (...)"

Comparing the situation in the former Yugoslavia with the processes of reconciliation in other regions (Cambodia, Rwanda, South Africa), we can conclude that reconciliation with the help of institutions such as the "Truth and Reconciliation Commission" in South Africa is possible only within the state itself (and, of course, provided that there is the state's will for reconciliation). By contrast, in a situation where the state is broken up after the war, as was the case with Yugoslavia, the leaders of the newly emerging states will easily fall into the temptation of continuing their nationalistic propaganda, in order to facilitate their rule, and will always tell the "truth" with a nationalistic tone.

In this paper, we would like to show an association between the statements of the "national leaders" in Serbia about ICTY and the public opinion on the Tribunal, as well as the changes in that opinion following the media coverage of evidence of the war crimes committed by the Serbian forces. In the beginning, let's take a look what was Serbia's public opinion towards the Tribunal in the past several years.

Public opinion in Serbia on ICTY

During the period of Milosevic's rule (until October 2000), the majority of media transmitted negative attitude of the regime towards the Tribunal as an "anti-Serb institution". Rare exceptions were independent electronic media gathered around the Association of Independent Media (ANEM) and daily newspaper *Danas*. Although the influence of independent media was not negligible, state media

(especially state TV) had a dominant influence on creating the public opinion (see for example Biro, Logar Đurić, & Bogosavljević, 2000). That fact, as well as the nature of the authoritarian regime, where it is dangerous to think and speak contrary to the official politics, contributed to the mostly negative attitude of Serbian citizens towards the Tribunal at the time. More than 60 percent of the population in Serbia were convinced that "ICTY did not offer justice"; while only 8.9 percent could remember any ICTY trial or sentence (Biro et al., 2000).

After the fall of the Milošević's regime in Serbia, the whole international community expected much more cooperation with ICTY and the punishment of the war criminals. Those acts were of great importance, not just for the reasons of reconciliation and better communication with the neighboring states, but for the changes in societal values in the population of Serbia.

However, in spite of the enormous pressure of EU and USA, cooperation with ICTY did not improve significantly. The main excuse of Serbian leaders of that time was that the Serbian public opinion towards the Tribunal was negative and that it was politically non-pragmatic to "pick in the eye" potential voters by standing for the cooperation with the Tribunal.

Let us see the results of the public opinion polls in Serbia on ICTY during first 11 years of "democratic rule" (2000–2011). We will present seven consecutive polls (Figure 1). In the first two, the author of this paper was the Principal Investigator. Both polls were field studies, reaching for households, using a random sample of the citizens of Serbia, without Kosovo. The sample was representative in relation to region and size of the inhabited place, and the representation in relation to gender, education, and age was provided through post-stratification. The research from 2000 (Biro et al., 2000) included 1100 subjects, and from 2001 (Biro, Mihić, Milin, & Logar, 2002) 1513 subjects. Data from 2003 are from Belgrade Centre for Human Rights and SMMRI (2003) done on 1000 subjects, using the same methodology. Data from 2004, 2006, and 2008 are from this author's (unpublished) research done on a representative sample (1000 subjects) of Serbia (without Kosovo) using CATI (Computer Assisted Telephone Interview). In all six surveys, the same question was asked: "Do you think that ICTY is partial against Serbs?" The seventh (also field) research was done by OSCE, BCHR, and IPSOS (2011) on 1407 subjects using the same methodology as in the first three polls. The question in 2011 poll was slightly different: "In your opinion, does ICTY have a different attitude towards individuals indicted for war crimes, depending on their ethnicity?" The percentage of "Yes" answers is presented in the Figure 1. It is important to note that Radovan Karadžić was arrested in 2008 (after our research was done), and Ratko Mladić in 2011 (before 2011 poll was done).

Looking at the Figure 1, it seems that the public opinion in Serbia on ICTY is slightly moving from extremely negative towards "less negative" from 2000 to 2008, and then increases in negativity after the extradition of Karadžić and Mladić to ICTY. So, it seems that the Serbian politicians had the precise observation of their voters.




Figure 1. Percentage of Serbian citizens who are convinced that "ICTY is partial against Serbs."

On the contrary, an analysis of the media coverage of ICTY and the attitudes toward ICTY of the Serbian leaders expressed in those media, shows that the conclusion could be quite different. It should be emphasized here that the majority of public opinion pools showed that 20–30% of the population stood for the "hard" anti-ICTY position, which coincides with the data about the same percentage of citizens with "hard" nationalist attitudes, while joint percentage of "hard" and "soft" opponents of the cooperation with the Tribunal always remained around 50%. On the other hand, it is a fact that "hard" supporters of the Tribunal hardly achieved 10–15%, while all the others were undecided or refused to answer – "I don't know", "I don't wish to answer" (Biro et al., 2002). Also, only about 15 percent supported cooperation with ICTY from the reasons of justice, while the majority of "supporters" advocated cooperation for the economic reasons (i.e., well-being of the country) – because that was the request of EU.

Thus, in numbers, the opponents of the Tribunal were dominant in Serbia, but those results could be a simple consequence of "socially desirable" answers. This "social desirability" was undoubtedly the result of the messages sent by the creators of the public opinion. The question that arises from that analysis is "what is a chicken and what is an egg", i.e., did public attitudes influence the behavior of politicians, or vice versa – are the public attitudes simply the result of the messages of the politicians?

Let us look at the presentation of ICTY in Serbian media.

The creators of public opinion in Serbia on ICTY

During the rule of the DOS coalition (October 2000 – fall 2003) among the creators of public opinion (political and national leaders, main media) some disputes appeared, but not for long. Among politicians, the opinion that public attitude towards the Tribunal was negative, prevailed.

Among political leaders, one of the most important was Vojislav Koštunica, who, at the beginning of that period, had undoubtedly the greatest credibility among the leaders of DOS. In his many statements about the Tribunal, attitudes that ICTY was a “political”, and not a legal institution (that sounded even more convincing coming from a distinguished professor of Law), that ICTY was biased against the Serbs, and that it was an instrument of the USA, dominated.

For example, on January 24th, 2001, the announcement of the Cabinet of the President of SRJ after the meeting between Del Ponte – Koštunica, stated that²: “Koštunica made a critique of the way that Tribunal was formed, the way it created its rules, the problem of secret indictments and the political engagement of the Tribunal, especially pointing to the danger of selective justice, i.e., breaking of one of the basic principles that justice has to be the same in the same or similar cases. Yugoslav president also pointed to the danger that the indictments towards most of Serbian political and military leaders, as well as the fact that there is the greatest number of indictments against the Serbs, can be understood as attribution of collective guilt to one nation, though Tribunal is formally insisting on the individual nature of responsibility.” Later on (January 2003), during the meeting with Prosper, Koštunica “presented facts which show the Tribunal’s selective justice”, adding that the number of indictments and the indictees’ rank indicates that The Hague Tribunal blames the Serbian side for the majority of the crimes. Koštunica emphasized that there were no indictments for crimes committed against the Kosovo Serbs, adding that this is why The Hague Tribunal does not enjoy the trust of the Yugoslav public³.

However, in the media from that period, there was a visible division. While radio and TV B92, as well as daily Danas, reported much more about war crimes and reported objectively about the work of the Tribunal, “liberated” state media gave equal time to the pro and contra arguments about ICTY, mostly in the form of a dialog between the two sides.

As in the Milošević’s period, there was a dramatic lack of information about war crimes, which should naturally give arguments in favor of the Court that prosecutes those crimes. A typical example is the state TV which on the 6th of October (the first day after the regime of Milošević was brought down) started to broadcast a serial about Serbian crimes in Srebrenica, but due to “public pressure”

² Medija klub. (2001, January 24). Retrieved from <http://www.medijaklub.cg.yu/zanimljivi/zanimljivi%202001/januar/231.htm>.

³ Beta. (2003, January 22). Retrieved from <http://www.mfa.gov.yu/Policy/Bilateral/USA/activities.e/230103e.html>.

abandoned the series after the first showing. (By the way, similar destiny had TV serial "Latinica", in Croatia).

Throughout these three years more data about the war crimes of Serbian side was offered to the citizens of Serbia only in a very rare instances (usually as an "excuse" for extradition of the indicted for war crimes): during and after the arrest of Milošević (2001), when facts about Kosovo crimes were presented (the truck full of bodies found in Danube river near Tekije, etc.); during and after the arrest of general Jokić (2002), when facts about the bombing of Dubrovnik were presented; and during and after the arrest of general Šljivančanin (2003), when the facts about the crime in Vukovar were presented. It should be emphasized that the facts about crimes were systematically published in the publications of the Fund for Humanitarian Law (this body published the facts about crimes in Kosovo even during the NATO intervention, which was considered to be the treason at the time!) and Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia. Unfortunately, the outreach of those publications was very limited indeed.

Unfortunately, even after the downfall of Milošević regime pointing to Serbian war crimes was treated as an "anti-state activity." For example, we will cite the statement from Vojislav Koštunica (February 2002)⁴: "I wish to say that this conditioning or praise and glorification of the Hague Tribunal often comes from within the country, sometimes from a lack of knowledge, sometimes from ignorance, sometimes from some servility towards the foreign world, and sometimes because of internal calculations and all that."

The extent to which ICTY was treated as an anti-Serb institution is also illustrated by the fact that, according to the daily newspaper Borba⁵, the Hague's Chief Prosecutor, Carla Del Ponte, was unable to pay her final respects to Zoran Đinđić, the slain Prime Minister. Del Ponte had originally planned to attend the funeral in a personal, unofficial visit to Belgrade, until Federal Foreign Minister Goran Svilanović advised her against the move. It is obvious that the presence of Carla del Ponte would (in the mind of Serbian political leaders) "spoil" the image of the late Prime Minister.

As the result of such media coverage, we notice that negative attitudes toward ICTY in 2003 even increased in comparison to 2001 (the fact that immediately after the fall of Milošević's regime attitudes toward ICTY were less negative is also a sign that it could be related to general atmosphere in the country).

Most data about Serbian war crimes appeared starting from the fall of 2003 up until 2008. In that period facts about Srebrenica, Vukovar, Eastern Bosnia, and Kosovo finally appeared, not only on state TV but also on the most popular private TV stations – Pink and BK, as well as in daily newspapers Blic, Politika, and Novosti. This change has little to do with the change in ruling elite, but more with the

⁴ Radio B92. (2002, February 1). Interview with Vojislav Koštunica. Retrieved from <http://www.b92.net/intervju/2002/kostunica.php>.

⁵ Borba. (2003, March 1). Retrieved from <http://www.borba.co.yu/politics.html>.

pressure of USA and EU (and probably also foreign donors to media, who conditioned their donations with the changed attitude towards the Tribunal).

The most important event that obviously influenced the public opinion in Serbia on ICTY and the war crimes in general was the VHS movie sequence showing the killing of civilians in Srebrenica by the paramilitary forces "Scorpions" (in October 2008). The sequence was broadcasted on the most important TV stations and contributed to the final "enlightenment" of public opinion in Serbia about the existence of Serbian war crimes. A few months earlier, President of Serbia Boris Tadić visited Srebrenica during the memorial and made the gesture of excuse. Those facts obviously contributed to the decrease of negative attitudes towards the Tribunal in the poll of 2008.

After the arrest of Karadžić, and especially after the arrest and extradition of Mladić, the opponents of ICTY were significantly louder in all Serbian media. That could be the explanation of the increase of negative attitudes toward ICTY registered in the last research presented (2011).

After the change of the regime (in 2012 coalition of SNS-SPS came to power), ICTY as the subject in Serbian media temporarily vanished. There were no new indictments for war crimes of high officials and politicians tried hard to avoid unpleasant themes. But, after the overturn of conviction of Ramush Haradinaj in April 2017, and Naser Orić in October 2017 (who was first sentenced for war crime in the neighborhood of Srebrenica and then liberated after the appeal) and especially after the life sentence for Ratko Mladić (December 2017), the unanimous condemnation of the Tribunal was present in Serbia⁶. Even on the most balanced and objective media, TV N1, there was a broadcast of the street interview in Banja Luka where all the participants claimed that Mladić is "our war hero"⁷.

It was not a surprise that in the last public opinion poll (Demostat, 2017) 56% of the Serbian citizens think that ICTY is nonobjective, additional 22% that its objectivity is "small", 18% that its objectivity is "medium", and only 6% that it is objective. (The question was different, so we could not include those data in our comparative analysis presented previously.) Furthermore, the results of that poll show that only 44% of citizens know what happened in Srebrenica, and only 29% know about Ovčara crime.

From the point of view of public opinion in Serbia, Tribunal missed a great chance to improve its image at the beginning of Milošević trial. According to the survey of media in the first week of July 2001, over one-half of Serbian citizens monitored the trial of Milošević⁸. Unfortunately, the concept where historical circumstances are considered at the beginning (instead of some summary of the main points of the indictment) was boring enough to alienate the audience, and the decision to call for the first witness Mahmut Bakali, ex-communist leader from

⁶ i. e. Stanišić, D. (2017, Politika. October 9). Naser Orić oslobođen krivice za zločine nad Srbima. Retrieved from <http://www.politika.rs/sr/clanak/390376/Naser-Oric-osloboden-krivice-za-zlocin-nad-Srbima>.

⁷ TV N1. (2017, November 22).

⁸ Beta. (2002, February 13). Retrieved from <http://groups.yahoo.com/group/balkanhr/message/3505>

Kosovo with the image of the promoter of Albanian nationalism during the 1980s, was the ideal pretext for the opponents of the Tribunal and their “crucial proof” of the anti-Serb nature of ICTY.

Another example is the trial of Vojislav Šešelj. Trying to preserve the presumption of innocence and fair trial, the judges of the Tribunal tolerated Šešelj’s extreme, but destructive (in a legal sense) and reckless behavior and, by doing so, damaged seriously the image of the Court. The release of Šešelj was not perceived as the fair trial for the Serbian nationalist, but as the “triumph of Šešelj over the Tribunal”⁹. For one side, this was a sign that ICTY has lost its dignity, and, for the other, that was a proof that ICTY has not enough power to punish war criminals¹⁰.

ICTY – political or legal court?

Even during the period when there was an interest for the work of the Tribunal (2003–2008), there was still almost nothing said about the nature of ICTY, the way it operates and its main goals and significance. Generally speaking, throughout the existence of ICTY in Serbia, the idea about its “political and not legal” nature was dominant. Usual connotation of the notion “political” was that ICTY is an “instrument of anti-Serb policies”. For example, in an interview for daily newspaper *Danas* (March 2001), Koštunica said¹¹: “I think that the need for The Hague Tribunal is coming from the political philosophy of the Clinton administration. We are talking about something that has a lot of elements of democratic totalitarianism and is an attempt to promote US interests in every part of the world and to protect and impose them in not only material, but also ideological matters.”

It is interesting that the only arguments based on the science of Law trying to support this thesis came from Kosta Čavoški, Professor of Law at the University of Belgrade and a President of NGO “Committee for the Truth about Karadžić”. He tried to prove in several pamphlets the “illegality” of ICTY. He disputed the legal basis of ICTY by pointing to the procedural problems during the establishment of ICTY, the fact that it created its own Rules and the fact that the prosecution had a disproportionately big influence on the procedure of the work of the Tribunal (Čavoški, 1998).

The majority of leading Serbian politicians accepted the claim about the “political Court” without digging deeper into the essence of the critique made toward ICTY that could be reduced to the procedural issues only, while disregarding the questions of justice and importance of the Tribunal for preventing future war crimes. Furthermore, guided by this idea, some of them complained that Tri-

⁹ i. e. Webtribune. (2016, March 31). Šešelj razbio haški sud, ali totalno [Blog post]. Retrieved from <http://webtribune.rs/razbio-haski-sud-ali-totalno-seselj-osloboden-svih-optuzbi/html>.

¹⁰ i. e. Al Jazeera Balkans. (2016, March, 31). Šešelj liberated, justice imprisoned [Blog post]. Retrieved from <http://balkans.aljazeera>.

¹¹ *Danas*. (2001, March, 3). Retrieved from <http://home.drenik.net/kovlad/Danas.%20V.%20Kostunica%20intervju.htm>.

bunal “has no understanding for the political situation in the country”, or that indictments from The Hague arrive “at a politically very inconvenient moment”. For example, Prime Minister Zoran Živković¹² criticized the new indictments as “a blow to reform in Serbia” and posed the following intriguing question: “Why (the indictments) today - seven days after the meeting in Vienna with the Kosovo Albanians and the international community, during a campaign for presidential elections in Serbia and when we are just about to start a debate on confidence in the government?”

Also, the majority of political leaders in Serbia accepted the idea that Tribunal represents “necessary evil” and that Serbia must cooperate with The Hague because of the state’s economic or political interests. For example, Zoran Đinđić¹³ explained: “The extradition of Milošević was a price for the lack of activity we demonstrated in this field last months. We do not get any reward for that, we are only preventing sanctions (...). It was not a trade ‘Milošević for money’, rather ‘Milošević for credibility.’” Thus, the question of justice seems to be completely lost, while cooperation with ICTY is treated as a plain bargain in the common interest.

The first serious discussion about the nature of war crimes was lead in the weekly *Vreme*, while the war still raged on (1994), between the author of this paper and Petar Kostić, the lecturer of the Military Academy who in his reader stood for the thesis that killing of civilians is one of the best means of psychological warfare, and that “only fools respect Geneva conventions during warfare”. The debate continued in five volumes of weekly and several other authors joined it¹⁴.

It is only much later that a number of authorized texts appeared which uphold the principle of justice and moral aspect of punishing all the war crimes (i.e., Sonja Biserko¹⁵). Those discussions finally started to question the very essence of law and justice. A wider legal debate was lead about the moral aspect of command responsibility. For example, answering the critiques about the legal problems of establishing command responsibility, Dragoljub Todorović¹⁶ cites article 7 of the Statute of ICTY: “The commander or superior officer is not on trial because he is commander or superior officer to the person who committed a criminal act, but because he knew or had reasons to know that his subordinate will commit such an act, or has already committed such an act, and his superior officer did not undertake necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such an act or punish the per-

¹² Beta. (2003, June 11). Retrieved from http://pinr.com/report.php?ac=viewreport&reportid=106&language_id=1.

¹³ Stefanović, N. (2001, *Vreme*, July 26). Zoran Đinđić, srpski premijer: Nisam najmoćniji čovek u Srbiji. Retrieved from <http://www.vreme.com/cms/view.php?id=293195>.

¹⁴ *Vreme*. (1994). October 17th, pp. 24-26; October, 31st; pp. 64-65; November, 7th, p. 64; November, 14th, pp. 62-63; December, 12th, pp. 62-63.

¹⁵ Bosnia Report. (2002, January–May, pp. 27-28). Retrieved from <http://www.bosnia.org.uk/bosrep/reportformat.cfm?articleid=843&reportid=153>.

¹⁶ *Danas*. (2004, July 22).

petrators.” Unfortunately, these texts were published only in low selling and rarely read media and did not influence public opinion in Serbia in a significant way.

Second dominant thesis used by the opponents of the Tribunal was that it is “biased against the Serbs”. During the counting of the number of accused and convicted in The Hague, the fact that ICTY documents do not mention the nationality of the accused in order to underline individual responsibility was (deliberately) overlooked.

The search for an “alibi” for one’s crimes in the crimes of other side is a typical manner of nationalist consciousness that accepts and registers only collective, completely disregarding the individual. The fact that the crimes of others in no way could diminish the horror and criminal nature of one’s crimes was pointed out several times¹⁷, but unfortunately, those attempts did not reach the consciousness of the majority of the Serbian citizens. Sadly, one of the very important roles of ICTY – the reconciliation among the conflicted nations is the least mentioned in Serbian media.

Conclusion

What I have tried to show in this paper is a strong correlation between the statements of the “national leaders” in Serbia about ICTY and the public opinion on the Tribunal, as well as the changes in that opinion following the media coverage of evidence of the war crimes committed by the Serbian forces. From the point of view of socio-psychological methodology, there are not enough valid facts for a conclusion that politicians and media created such a public opinion, i.e., one cannot interpret the observed association in the terms of causal relation. It is always possible that the different statements in the observed period would not change the public opinion at all (as the Serbian politicians claimed) and that the registered changes are just a consequence of the time passed. However, the data presented in this paper could be a warning on the significance of the political leaders for creating public opinion in the authoritarian society influenced by nationalistic ideology, like Serbian society (still) is.

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¹⁷ i. e. Danas. (1999, October 30–31). Dnevnik. (2001, July 8). Politika. (2002, April 18).

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**JAVNO MNJENJE SRBIJE O HAŠKOM
TRIBUNALU: KOKOŠKA ILI JAJE?**

Rad prikazuje rezultate sedam ispitivanja javnog mnjenja u Srbiji (u periodu 2000–2011) u kojima je postavljeno pitanje o tome da li je Haški tribunal pristrasan prema Srbima. Promene u stavovima tokom posmatranih godina autor dovodi u vezu sa javnim izjavama političkih lidera o Tribunalu, kao i sa prikazivanjem činjenica o srpskim ratnim zločinima u srpskim medijima. Iako demonstrirana povezanost ne može biti interpretirana kauzalno, autor upozorava na značajnu ulogu kreatora javnog mnjenja i nudi pretpostavku da političari i mediji nisu reagovali reaktivno na stavove građana (kao što su često tvrdili), već da su, obrnuto, svojim izjavama i iznošenjem činjenica značajno doprinisili stavovima građana Srbije o Haškom tribunalu.

Ključne reči: Haški tribunal, javno mnjenje u Srbiji

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Intergroup contact reduces prejudice and improves outgroup attitudes, while a salient social identity might have the opposite effects. Recent research has shown that exposure to positive information about the outgroup could influence such effects of the contact and social identity on the outgroup attitudes. Here we investigate the effects of the contact and social identity on the outgroup attitudes, and forgiveness toward the outgroup of Bosniak Muslims among Serbs ($N = 400$) by randomly allocating them into control and experimental groups. In the experimental condition, the students were presented with brief biographies of three eminent Bosniak Muslims, in the positive context, after which they completed a survey. In the control group, students were only presented with the survey without the biographies. Subsequent independent samples *t*-tests showed that the mean values for ingroup identification and intergroup trust were significantly different in the two groups. Specifically, participants who were in the experimental condition, being exposed to the positive information about Bosniak Muslims, reported a higher level of intergroup trust and a lower level of ingroup identification as Serbian. We then performed a multi-group structural equation modeling through which we tested a predictive role of the past contact and in-the group identification on trust and collective guilt in both control and experimental conditions. Across both groups, past contact positively and ingroup identification negatively predicted both intergroup attitudes and forgiveness via trust and collective guilt. Exposure to the positive information about the outgroup moderated the indirect effects of the ingroup identification on the intergroup attitudes via collective guilt.

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² A part of data presented at the Mini Conference on Political Psychology in South-Eastern Europe, Novi Sad, Serbia, 7–9 October 2016.

Intergroup contact, i.e. bringing individuals from rival groups together under certain conditions, has positive effects on conflict reduction. Since its inception in 1954, numerous studies have backed this conflict reducing effects of the intergroup contact (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1998; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2008). We now know that a direct contact reduces prejudice if the contact is sanctioned by norms and authorities; if there is a friendship potential; if individuals from different groups have equal status during the interaction and they can work toward a common goal that will benefit both groups (Pettigrew, 1998). Intergroup contact is even shown to improve attitudes and reduce a conflict among groups which have been involved in the violent conflicts such as Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland (Tam et al., 2008; Tam, Hewstone, Kenworthy, & Cairns, 2009; Tausch, Kenworthy, Cairns, & Christ, 2007) or Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots (Papadakis, 2008; Psaltis & Cakal, 2016; Tausch et al., 2010). Despite these convincing findings, bringing people from different groups is simply not possible in some situations, especially during the intense conflicts or in violent intergroup relations. Take for example the aforementioned intergroup context in Cyprus. Two communities were involved in a violent conflict from 1963 to 1974, when Turkey intervened. At the time, Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots were completely isolated from each other by a heavily guarded border (Lytras & Psaltis, 2011; Psaltis, Beydola, Filippou, & Vrachimis, 2014) until 2003, when the border was opened. Another case in point is the present day intergroup context between Bosniak Muslims and Serbs who now live in separate states or in ethnically more homogeneous territories, where they are the dominant group. In Serbia, for instance, there is no possibility of the present-day contact with the Bosniak Muslims. One can rely on the effects of the positive past contact, but to what extent this past contact has the potential to improve the present-day intergroup relations between Serbs and Bosniak Muslims is difficult to know. Recent research has shown that contact has the capacity to improve the outgroup attitudes even among Serbs and Bosniak Muslims who have had a history of violent conflict (Voci, Hadziosmanovic, Hewstone, Cakal, & Veneziani, 2017). These findings show that intergroup contact can even override the effects of the past violent conflict. In the current state of affairs, however, bringing the two communities together with the aim of improving the intergroup relations may not be possible due to physical constraints, i.e. the existence of an actual border, homogenization of each community in a particular geographical location, or strong condemnation of such contact by social norms. In the last decade, research has shown that the alternative forms of contact, such as extended, imagined, and vicarious contacts, can have a positive effect on the intergroup attitudes even in situations in which bringing the two groups involved in conflict might not be possible (Vezzali et al., 2015; Vezzali, Hewstone, Capozza, & Wolfer, 2014). The extended contact refers to situations when individuals are aware of another member of the group who has outgroup friends (Wright, Aron, McLaughlin-Volpe, & Ropp, 1997), and in the imagined contact situation, individuals are mentally stimulated by having a positive interaction with an outgroup member. Both extended and imagined contact scenarios involve either a real-life

situation or a dimension of agentic involvement, whereas in vicarious contact situations (Joyce & Harwood, 2012), individuals are exposed to positive intergroup situations via a recorded footage or a written text. Compared to other forms of indirect contacts, in an ideal vicarious contact situation, individuals are passive consumers of the information they are being exposed to. However, most of this research on vicarious contact has been conducted in the non-violent intergroup situations. Recent work on the contexts with a history of conflict (e.g. in Bosnia and Herzegovina), has highlighted a) the potential benefits of contacts across the intergroup spectrum (Freeman, 2012); (b) the need to repair social relations between groups involved in the conflict (Corkalo et al., 2004); and (c) has shown that even proximity to the outgroup increases trust and decreases fear of the outgroup (Mironova & Whitt, 2014). It is still not clear whether these alternative contact experiences would be equally effective in improving the intergroup relations in these more conflicting contexts.

In the present research we have taken the first stab at this, and focused on the vicarious contact across groups which have been involved in a violent conflict in the past, i.e. Serbians who live in Serbia as the ingroup, and Bosniak Muslims in general as the outgroup. In what follows we first briefly review the research on the vicarious contact, and outline the intergroup relations between the two groups. Then we report a study in which we have manipulated the exposure to positive information on the outgroup of Bosniak Muslims, as a proxy of the vicarious contact, and investigate the moderating role of this information in relation to our independent variables, past contact effects, and ingroup identification, with our outcome variables, forgiveness and outgroup attitudes, via trust and collective guilt. We have collected our data in a large University of Belgrade, where there is little opportunity for contacts with the outgroup of Bosniak Muslims.

Vicarious contact and positive information

In simple terms, in a vicarious contact situation, group members are provided with a narrative account of a positive encounter with an outgroup member. This might include a description of an intergroup contact situation via a text or a script, or even a positive description of an outgroup member (Mazziotta, Mummendey, & Wright, 2011). Various research has demonstrated that different operationalizations of a vicarious contact can positively improve intergroup attitudes (Mazziotta et al., 2011); meta-stereotypes (Gómez & Huici, 2008), while decreasing prejudice (West, Holmes, & Hewstone, 2011) across different target outgroups, such as immigrants (Joyce & Harwood, 2012; Mazziotta et al., 2011) or mentally ill (West et al., 2011), in the non-violent intergroup settings. Joyce and Harwood (2012) exposed their participants to interactions between US border patrol and an illegal immigrant. In the positive interaction condition, participants reported to like the illegal immigrant more, and this improved attitudes generalized to other outgroups which were not involved in the contact situation. Similar findings were

reported by Mazziotta and his colleagues (2011), and by West et al. (2011), who exposed their participants to positive textual information on people with schizophrenia. In their first experiment, West et al. (2011), who found that the imagined neutral contact with a stigmatized group might have negative consequences due to the increased intergroup anxiety. Then, they provided their participants in the neutral imagined contact conditions with the external stereotype, disconfirming evidence via vignettes (Experiment 2). The results showed that providing positive factual information on four real individuals via vignettes decreased the intergroup anxiety and increased the outgroup attitudes. Taken together, these results suggested that the vicarious contact and positive information external to the contact situation could potentially improve the outgroup attitudes in various intergroup contexts. If the exposure to positive information about the outgroup has the potential to improve the intergroup context, then it can also improve the intergroup relations between groups which were involved in a violent conflict. Most intergroup conflicts involve extreme denigration of the outgroup on the basis of the fact that the definition of the outgroup as a threat to the ingroup that is "uniquely good and virtuous" celebrates the eradication of the external threat, i.e. the outgroup, as a necessary step to protect the ingroup (Reicher, Haslam, & Rath, 2008). Therefore, one can hypothesize that exposing individuals to positive information about the outgroup might result in a situation where some extremities done to the outgroup should not have been done, and the outgroupers could be trusted. In the next section, we discuss these two possible mechanisms, i.e. collective guilt and intergroup trust.

Collective guilt and intergroup trust

Research shows that accepting that one's group has mistreated the others, i.e., collective guilt (Branscombe & Doosje, 2004; Branscombe, Doosje, & McGarty, 2003) is associated with prosocial behaviour toward the outgroup, intentions to restore justice, forgiveness, and decreased bias (Branscombe & Doosje, 2004). Collective guilt is negatively predicted by identification with the group. Because individuals seek to enhance their group identity, an acknowledgement of a past wrongdoing at the group level can damage this esteem related to their membership to the group. Hence, they might be tempted to ignore information regarding the past wrongdoings (Harth, Kessler, & Leach, 2008). Conversely, however, when ingroupers interact with members of an outgroup that has been mistreated by the ingroup, they might be more willing to accept their group's past wrongdoings. Using data from three representative surveys conducted in Northern Ireland, (Hewstone, Cairns, McLernon, Niens, & Noor (2004) showed that more positive contact with the outgroup of Catholics and Protestants predicted more group-based guilt, which in turn was associated with forgiveness, positive outgroup attitudes, and more willingness to support peace and reconciliation. Research conducted in the post-war Croatia, for

instance, showed that identification with the ingroup was a significant positive predictor of collective guilt assignment and collective guilt acceptance via justification of ingroup wrongdoing (Jelic, Biruski, & Ajdukovic, 2013).

Another important psychological mechanism linked to forgiveness and positive outgroup attitudes is the intergroup trust. Trust, as the expectation of benevolent motives of others that they will not exploit one's vulnerabilities, is an important positive predictor of cooperation, and a negative predictor of the conflict (Balliet & Van Lange, 2013). Because trust is an iterative process during which interacting partners establish their willingness not to exploit the other party, it requires a series of encounters. As such, positive intergroup encounters are predictors par excellence of coming to trust the outgroup (Tam et al., 2009; Tropp, 2008). For example, Hewstone, Cairns, Voci, Hamberger, and Niens (2006) showed that the intergroup contact could act as an antecedent of trust, and more importantly, it could predict forgiveness via intergroup trust among groups which shared a historical conflict.

Past research also showed that among Bosniak Muslims, for example, a high-quality contact with Serbs predicted forgiveness via increased trust and decreased intergroup anxiety (Brown, Cehajic, & Castano, 2008). Despite the previous research showing how the intergroup contact improved intergroup attitudes, particularly promoting forgiveness, trust and collective guilt, it is not known if the vicarious contact, i.e. an exposure to positive information, would exert a similar positive effect on forgiveness and collective guilt in particular. Given that the intergroup contact reduces prejudice and increases forgiveness by increasing trust and collective guilt, it follows that exposure to positive information about the outgroup could only emphasize these effects. More specifically, any form of a positive past contact would increase trust and collective guilt, which in turn would predict more forgiveness, and improved attitudes toward the outgroup. These paths, however, would be positively moderated by exposure to positive information.

Social identity and outgroup attitudes

Extant literature also shows that another important predictor of the outgroup attitudes and forgiveness, especially among groups involved in the violent conflict, is the way individuals identify with their groups, called social identity (Hewstone et al., 2006; Myers & Cairns, 2009). Social identity here refers to a sense of self people derive from their group membership which provides a lens through which people interpret a variety of social experiences and seek to tackle positive and negative life events (Haslam, Oakes, Turner, & McGarty, 1996; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Because individuals seek to achieve a positive self-image (Abrams & Hogg, 1988; Crisp & Abrams, 2009; Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 2004), attempts to show that the ingroup is "positively distinct from the outgroup" can result in negative outgroup bias, thus increasing the intergroup conflict (Turner

& Crisp, 2010). Across different intergroup domains, such as racial, ethnic, and social, stronger identification with the ingroup predicts negative attitudes toward the outgroup (Duckitt & Mphuthing, 1998); increases perceived threats from the outgroup and increases stronger motivations to engage in-group serving behaviour (Cakal, Hewstone, Guler, & Heath, 2016). Furthermore, those who strongly identify with their group experience less collective guilt (Doosje, 2006; Doosje et al., 2004), resulting from past atrocities perpetrated by their group against the outgroup. For example, Čehajić and Brown (2008), qualitatively showed that Serbian participants were less willing to accept atrocities committed by the ingroup in order to preserve a positive social identity.

Thus, we argue that in order to unpack the effects of the contact and exposure to positive information on the outgroup attitudes, especially among groups which share a history of violent intergroup conflicts, one needs to understand how individuals identify with their group. Last but not least, because outgroup attitudes are a general perspective toward the outgroup without high psychological cost, we also include forgiveness which is more directly linked to reconciliation, and which has a relatively high cost compared to outgroup attitudes. Accordingly, we hypothesize that the ingroup identification will predict the intergroup trust and collective guilt negatively, which in turn will be associated with positive intergroup attitudes and more forgiveness.

Present research

Serbs and Bosniak Muslims are two Slavic nations, with some cultural, political, historical and religious differences. Although they have lived together for centuries, most recently as a single nation during the Communist regime in Yugoslavia, there have been significant differences regarding the political power and the status with Serbs being the economic and political majority. After The Second World War and during the communist Yugoslavia, the country went through a rapid modernization process, but this did not eradicate the ethnic identities (Smits, 2010). However, the modernization also resulted in the increased autonomy of the constituent republics (Hodson, Sekulic, & Massey, 1994). The intergroup relations between the two groups were cordial, but the cross-group marriages were not very common (Smits, 2010). Following the end of the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia, two groups were involved in one of the bloodiest and most violent conflicts in the recent history of Europe. It was believed that the conflict as such and the ensuing atrocities were the product of the ethnic competition that was fostered by the increased unemployment and scarier resources over which two groups competed together with other ethnic groups. The then deliberate misuse of history by the leaders to gain control of the political and economic resources resulted in ethnic polarization. Alternatively, one can also argue that ethnic polarization and an emphasis on group differences might have exacerbated the threat

from the outgroup (Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006). This, in turn, was used by politicians to gain leverage and personal interests. In the post-conflict era, politicians and policymakers established strong conflictive narratives, through school curricula and media, promoting victimization and negative stereotypes of other group members (Mirković, 1996). Consequently, during the post-conflict period, people, especially young generations, have obtained knowledge about the other group almost exclusively from those negative narratives, without many chances for the direct personal experience. It is therefore essential to understand factors that might contribute reconciliation between the two nations (Petrović, 2017). It is against this backdrop that we wanted to test our hypotheses. Specifically, we have hypothesized that the past contact with Bosniak Muslims would positively predict the outgroup attitudes and forgiveness via trust and collective guilt, while identification as Serbian would be their negative predictor. Based on our interpretation of the research on the vicarious contact, we have further hypothesized that the exposure to positive information would positively moderate these paths.

Method

Participants and procedure

Four hundred students (227 females, $M_{\text{age}} = 22.62$, $SD = 4.75$) from a major University of Belgrade were invited to participate in the research by completing a pen-and-paper questionnaire on attitudes toward “the other groups” in Serbia. They were recruited by a research assistant on a voluntary basis. Upon consenting to participate, participants were randomly allocated to the control and experimental group (positive information exposure group). In the control condition, all the participants directly proceeded to complete the questionnaire on the intergroup attitudes toward Bosniak Muslims. In the experimental condition, participants were exposed to positive information on Bosniak Muslims. They were presented with short biographies of three prominent Bosniak Muslims (Mustafa Kućuković, a famous football player; Mersad Berber, a painter, and Nasiha Kapidžić-Hadžić, a poet). Then they were asked to answer three basic reading comprehension questions on the biographies to assure that the participants read the biographies (see Appendix for a sample biography). Once they completed reading and answering the questions, they proceeded to complete the questionnaire.

Measures

We adapted and accordingly worded all our variables to the current context. Thus, all questions were phrased in such a way that they focused on the intergroup relations and attitudes toward Bosniak Muslims. All variables except the intergroup attitudes were measured by a 7-point Likert type scales (three items

for each variable, ranged from 1 = *strongly disagree* to 7 = *strongly agree*). To have a standard set of measures, we selected the three best performing items (with factor loadings above .50; Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010; Kline, 2011). Only the intergroup attitudes were measured by a 7-point bipolar semantic differential scales. Higher values indicated more past contact with Bosnians, higher identification as a Serb, higher levels of the intergroup trust, collective guilt, and forgiveness, and more positive attitudes toward Bosnians. Cronbach's alphas were given in Table 1. We included the Serbian version of the questionnaire in the Appendix.

Past contact. Items were adapted from Voci, Hadziosmanovic, Hewstone, Cakal, and Veneziani (2017): e.g. 'Have you ever had any contact with Bosniak Muslims (*never-frequently*)?'.

Identification as Serbian. Items were adapted from Luhtanen and Crocker (1992): e.g. 'Being Serbian is an important part of my identity',

Collective guilt. Items were adapted from Wohl and Branscombe (2005): e.g. 'I feel guilty about the negative things my community has done to the other community (Bosniak Muslims) in the past'.

Intergroup Trust. The scale was adapted from Tam, Hewstone, Kenworthy, and Cairns(2009):e.g. 'Most members of the Bosniak community, in general, can be trusted'.

Intergroup Attitudes. The scale was adapted from Abrams, Eller, and Bryant (2006). Participants responded to semantic differential items, e.g. 'Please describe how you feel about Bosniak Muslims (*negative- positive*)'.

Intergroup Forgiveness. The items were adapted from Wohl & Branscombe (2005), e.g. 'I am able to show mercy towards offenders from the Bosniak community who committed atrocities to my community.'

Results

We reported the means and standard deviations of all variables in Table 1. Then we conducted a one-way between-subjects analysis of variance (positive information vs. no information/control). The results showed that the participants differed only in two variables: identification ($F(1, 397) = 8.44, p < .05$) and trust ($F(1, 397) = 4.36, p < .05$). In the experimental conditions, the participants reported lower levels of the ingroup identification ($M = 3.54, SD = 1.73$), and higher levels of trust ($M = 4.57, SD = 1.34$), compared to the participants in the control group (ingroup identification $M = 4.05, SD=1.75$; trust $M = 4.26, SD = 1.58$). These results showed that the exposure to positive information about the outgroup Bosniak Muslims significantly increased the level of trust toward the Bosniak Muslims, and the way individuals identified with their group. Afterwards, we proceeded to explore the relations between our variables and whether exposure to positive information moderated these associations.

Table 1

Means and standard deviations of all variables as a function of exposure to positive information

Variable	α	Control ($n = 200$)		Positive information ($n = 200$)	
		<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Past contact	.86	3.56	1.62	3.63	1.50
Ingroup identification	.87	4.05	1.75	3.54	1.73
Collective guilt	.92	3.49	1.70	3.86	1.43
Intergroup trust	.92	4.27	1.58	4.57	1.34
Intergroup attitudes	.90	4.93	1.41	4.93	1.39
Forgiveness	.69	4.84	1.51	3.88	1.49

Model construction

Observed variables (the items we used to measure each variable) were combined to create latent variables, and the resulting model was tested via Structural Equation Modelling (Muthen & Muthen, 2008a, 2008b). Confirmatory factor analysis revealed that all our items loaded onto expected factors and did not cross-load onto other factors. The results also showed that all of our observed variables had good to excellent loadings on to their respective latent variables (above .50; Kline, 2011). Our model (Figure 1) fit the data well ($\chi^2_{(120)} = 204.29, p < .001, CFI = .97, RMSEA = .04, SRMR = .04$; good fit is indicated by a non-significant $\chi^2, \chi^2/df$ ratio lower than or equal to 3, .06 or lower for RMSEA, .95 or higher for CFI, and .08 or lower for SRMR, see Bentler, 2007; Hu & Bentler, 1999).




Figure 1. The structural equation model showing the estimated associations between the variables of interest.

Note. Ingroup ($\chi^2_{(149)} = 243.38, p < .001, \chi^2/df = 1.65, CFI = .95, RMSEA = .06, SRMR = .04$). Correlations between other variables in the model: Past contact-identification as Serbian, $r = -.05, p > .05$; Intergroup trust-collective guilt, $r = .34, p < .05$; Intergroup attitudes-forgiveness, $r = .18, p < .05$. Dashed lines showed the paths moderated by exposure to positive information about the outgroup.

Hypothesis testing. Our base model showed that the past contact positively and directly predicted the intergroup trust and intergroup attitudes. Ingroup identification negatively predicted the intergroup trust and collective guilt. The intergroup trust positively predicted both intergroup attitudes and forgiveness.

Indirect effects. We were also interested in the indirect effects of our two predictor variables, identification as a Serbian and the past contact on forgiveness via the intergroup trust and collective guilt. We created point estimates (PE) representing the effect sizes, and we probed these PE by creating confidence intervals based on 5,000 re-samples using the bias-corrected bootstrap command in Mplus (Muthen & Muthen, 2008b). A significant indirect effect of a predictor was indicated by confidence intervals (CI), not including zero (Hayes, 2013; Preacher & Hayes, 2008). Below, we first reported the indirect effects in the single group analysis (Table 2). As can be seen, identification as a Serbian had a negative indirect effect on the intergroup attitudes and forgiveness via the intergroup trust. Conversely, the past contact with Bosniak Muslims had a positive indirect effect on the intergroup attitudes and forgiveness, again via the intergroup trust.

Table 2

Indirect effects of identification as Serbian and the past intergroup contact on intergroup attitudes and forgiveness via trust and collective guilt

Path	Mediator	Point estimate (β)	95% CI–99% CI
Identification: intergroup attitudes	Intergroup trust	-.17	-.28–.09
Identification: forgiveness	Intergroup trust	-.08	-.17–.01
Past contact: intergroup attitudes	Intergroup trust	.13	.04–.22
Past contact: forgiveness	Intergroup trust	.06	.01–.13

Note. Bootstrap is based on 5000 re-samples.

Moderating effects of the vicarious contact. In line with our hypotheses, we tested the effect of exposure to positive information on the outgroup in all possible paths. In line with Jaccard and Wan (1996), we run a multi-group analysis on the basis of exposure to the vicarious contact or positive information (experimental group), and the control group. We used the Satorra–Bentler chi-Square difference test (Satorra & Bentler, 2010) to compare the fit values of the model where the path in question is constrained to be equal across the models (a nested model), and the unconstrained model (a baseline model). The baseline model fit the data well ($\chi^2_{(264)} = 376.28, p < .001, CFI = .97, RMSEA = .05, SRMR = .05$). Constraining each possible path to be equal across both groups, we found several significant paths (Table 3).

Table 3

Moderating effect of exposure to positive information on the association between variables in the model

Path	$\Delta\chi^2(df)$	p
Collective guilt – intergroup attitudes	9.25(1)	.002
Trust – intergroup attitudes	36.41(1)	.000
Identification – trust	4.21(1)	.004

Firstly, the model in which we constrained the collective guilt–intergroup attitudes path to be equal across groups fit the data considerably worse ($\chi^2_{(265)} = 383.28, p < .001, CFI = .96, RMSEA = .05, SRMR = .06; \Delta\chi^2(1) = 9.25, p = .002$). Specifically, in the control group, collective guilt was negatively associated with the intergroup attitudes ($\beta = -.23, p < .001$), whereas the same association was non-significant in the vicarious contact ($\beta = -.07, p > .05$). Secondly, the model

in which we constrained the trust-intergroup attitudes path to be equal across groups fit the data considerably worse ($\chi^2_{(265)} = 391.21, p < .001, CFI = .96, RMSEA = .05, SRMR = .07; \Delta\chi^2_{(1)} = 36.41, p < .001$). In the control group, trust had a medium sized effect on the intergroup attitudes ($\beta = .38, p < .001$), whereas in the vicarious contact group this effect was larger ($\beta = .67, p < .001$). Finally, the model in which we constrained the identification as Serbian-trust path to be equal across groups fit the data considerably worse ($\chi^2_{(265)} = 380.64, p < .001, CFI = .96, RMSEA = .05, SRMR = .06; \Delta\chi^2_{(1)} = 4.21, p = .041$). In the control group, identification as a Serbian had a larger negative effect on trust ($\beta = -.22, p < .001$), whereas in the vicarious contact group this effect was ($\beta = .39, p < .001$).

Afterwards, we run a second analysis, in which we unpacked these indirect effects by the group (a control versus experimental group), in order to explore the moderating role of exposure to positive information on indirect effects of identification, and the past contact on intergroup attitudes and forgiveness. The results showed that in the control condition, identification as a Serbian had an indirect effect on the intergroup attitudes (PE $\beta = -.07, 99\% CI [-.19, -.01]$), but this effect disappeared in the experimental contact condition (PE $\beta = .12, 95\% CI [-.03, .19]$). This suggested that the vicarious contact experience moderated the indirect effects of identification via collective guilt.

Discussion

By using an experimental design, we tested whether the exposure to positive external information would influence the effects of the past contact and identification as a Serbian on the outgroup attitudes and forgiveness. More specifically, we predicted that the past contact with the Bosniak outgroup members would be positively associated with the outgroup attitudes and increased forgiveness via trust and collective guilt, while identification as a Serbian would have a negative effect on the outgroup attitudes and forgiveness by decreasing trust and collective guilt. It was also predicted that the impact of both past intergroup contact and ingroup identification as a Serbian would be moderated by exposure to positive information. We found a partial support for these hypotheses. While the past contact did improve the intergroup trust and outgroup attitudes, these paths were not moderated by the exposure to positive information. Accordingly, the exposure to positive information moderated the ingroup identification – intergroup trust, intergroup trust-intergroup attitudes, and collective guilt – intergroup attitudes paths only.

These findings complement and extend the previous research on the contact, social identity, collective guilt, and forgiveness. More specifically, we showed that the enduring effects of the past contact was a significant predictor of the present-day outgroup attitudes toward Bosniak Muslims among Serbs as well (Cehajic & Brown, 2010). Also, we complement earlier research on the predictors of collec-

tive guilt and showed that collective guilt was not only predicted by the ingroup identification (Jelic, Biruski, & Ajdukovic, 2013), but also by the past contact via intergroup trust. This effect was positively moderated by exposure to positive information.

Implications for research on the intergroup contact

Our research shows that the contact has lasting effects on the intergroup attitudes even after a considerable time. This effect is both direct and indirect via increased intergroup trust, as our data show. Effects of the past contact on the outgroup attitudes can be fostered by exposing the individuals to positive information about the outgroup. Our findings show that this effect is indirect rather than direct. However, it seems that while the past contact was both directly and indirectly associated with the intergroup attitudes, which is in line with the previous literature, the past contact effects on forgiveness are mainly indirect via an increased intergroup trust. However, this effect is more observational than experimental. Contrary to our expectations, we had a partial support for the full moderating effects of exposure to positive information. While we have found significant differences in three paths, namely ingroup identification-intergroup trust, intergroup trust-intergroup attitudes, and collective guilt-intergroup attitudes across two groups, only the indirect effect of the ingroup identification on intergroup attitudes via collective guilt was moderated by exposure to positive information. Taken together, these results might sound inconclusive. The findings suggest however that the effects of the previous contact on forgiveness and intergroup attitudes are robust and can survive the subsequent negative experiences, even in the face of new positive information. On the other hand, this could be also interpreted as that these effects cannot be improved upon. Future research should seek to unpack these findings by manipulating both contact and exposure to new information simultaneously.

Implications for the research on social identity

As our results have shown, it appears that the negative effects of the ingroup identification on the intergroup attitudes via collective guilt can be reversed by exposing the ingroup members to positive information about the outgroup. Given the practical limitations on the intergroup contact in conflicting contexts, this finding brings fresh hope for reconciliation and reduction of prejudice in intractable conflicts. However, the present research was conducted in the context of the past conflict. It would be particularly interesting to see whether the indirect and direct effects of the past contact would hold in situations where the conflict is ongoing. Similarly, the previous research also suggests that a common ingroup identity could buffer the negative effects of the ingroup identification on the intergroup attitudes. Future research could look into whether exposure to positive informa-

tion on the outgroup target could enhance possible positive effects of common in-group identity, while decreasing the negative effects of the ingroup identification.

Limitations

Our research has at least three limitations. First, we did not have baseline measures of our variables. Therefore one could argue that the differences could not be attributed to our experimental manipulation. Although this might sound as plausible, we also note under current circumstances and simple experimental design, that the pre-test measures could introduce a certain amount of bias. It would be ideal to test whether this is indeed the situation in a more complex design, such as repeated measures. Second, we did not have behavioral measures. Therefore we could only speculate that our measures are proxy measures, and that the findings are in line with the previous research. Thirdly, our sample is not random. We recruited students who were born mainly in the post-conflict era. Thus it is difficult to guess to what extent these findings could be replicated in the general population. Last but not least, we conducted our research in the context of the past conflict. Therefore, there is a possibility for our findings to be tainted by more recent interactions via media or other forms of communication.

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**MEĐUGRUPNI KONTAKT I MEĐUGRUPNA
IDENTIFIKACIJA KAO PREDIKTORI
MEĐUGRUPNIH STAVOVA I
OPRAŠTANJA U SRPSKOM KONTEKSTU:
MODERIRAJUĆA ULOGA IZLAGANJA
POZITIVNIM INFORMACIJAMA**

Intergrupni kontakt smanjuje predrasude i poboljšava stavove prema tuđim grupama, dok istaknuti socijalni identitet može imati suprotne efekte. Nedavna istraživanja pokazala su da izloženost pozitivnim informacijama o tuđoj grupi može da utiče na efekte kontakta i socijalnog identiteta na stavove prema tuđim grupama. U ovom istraživanju se ispituju efekti kontakta i socijalnog identiteta na stavove prema Bošnjacima i na praštanje prema njima, na uzorku Srba ($N = 400$) slučajno raspoređenih u kontrolnu i eksperimentalnu grupu. U eksperimentalnoj grupi ispitanicima su predstavljene kratke biografije tri eminentna Bošnjaka muslimana, u pozitivnom kontekstu, nakon čega su ispitanici odgovarali na upitnike. U kontrolnoj grupi ispitanici su samo odgovarali na upitnik, bez biografija. Rezultati su pokazali da se prosečne vrednosti za unutargrupnu identifikaciju i međugrupno poverenje značajno razlikuju između ove dve grupe. Konkretno, kod ispitanika koji su bili u eksperimentalnoj grupi, tj. izloženi pozitivnim informacijama o Bošnjacima, registrovan je viši nivo intergrupnog poverenja i niži nivo unutargrupne identifikacije kao Srba. Zatim je sprovedeno modeliranje multi-grupnim strukturalnim jednačinama, preko kojih je testiran prediktivni efekat prošlog kontakta i unutar grupne identifikacije na međugrupne stavove i praštanje, uz medijatorski efekat poverenja i kolektivne krivice, kako u kontrolnoj, tako i eksperimentalnoj grupi. U obe situacije prošli kontakt je pozitivno, a unutargrupna identifikacija negativno predviđala i međugrupne stavove i praštanje preko poverenja i kolektivne krivice. Izloženost pozitivnim informacijama o tuđoj grupi moderirala je indirektno efekte unutargrupne identifikacije na međugrupne stavove preko kolektivne krivice.

Ključne reči: kontakt, socijalni identitet, poverenje, kolektivna krivica, praštanje

Appendix A

Positive information vignettes

Mustafa Kučuković

He started his professional career at Hamburger SV in September 2004, and made his Bundesliga debut as a second-half substitute in the club's away match against VfB Stuttgart on 11 September 2004. He scored a goal only two minutes after entering the match as a substitute in Bundesliga in 2005. On 8 June 2011, he signed a two-year contract with Energie Cottbus. Described as a strong-willed man with impressive self-control and disarming skills in the field, Mustafa is one of the best promising players in Germany.

1. When did Mustafa start his career?
2. Did he score any goals in Bundesliga so far?
3. What kind of a person is he?

Mersad Berber

Berber was born in Bosanski Petrovac, Kingdom of Yugoslavia. He was trained at the Academy of Fine Arts in Ljubljana, where he graduated with a B.A and MA. In 1978, Berber received a teaching position at the Academy of Fine Arts in Sarajevo. Today, Berber is known as one of the best known graphic artists in the world. He was included in the Tate Gallery collection in 1984. Berber has amassed an impressive range of international prizes and is considered one of the most prominent artists from the Balkans.

1. Where did Mersad receive his training?
2. Where did he start to teach first?
3. Name a famous museum where his work has been exhibited?

Nasiha Kapidžić-Hadžić

(1931–1995) is a Bosnian writer and poet of a great renown. Nasiha was born in Banja Luka. She finished elementary and high school in Banja Luka, and graduated from University of Philosophy in Belgrade. Nasiha became a professor and worked as a radio producer for children shows. Her literature was dedicated to children. She even published some textbooks for elementary schools. Most of her work is now considered as excellent examples of children's literature in the Balkans. As an individual, she was a hard-working and very optimistic person. She was proud of the multicultural structure of her country, and helped to establish good relations between the communities that made up the former Yugoslavia.

1. Where did Nasiha study for high school?
2. What kind of programmes did she make?
3. What kind of a person was she?

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TEMPORAL CHANGES IN THE EVALUATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES: DOES EVALUATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES REFLECT ATTITUDINAL IDEOLOGIES?²

Previous research has shown that since the beginning of the 1990s, differentiation in the ideological orientations of political parties in Serbia has been increased. Comparing three samples, we explored the temporal stability of relations between evaluations of Serbian political parties (DSS, DS, SRS, SPS, SNS, and LDP) and lexically derived ideological dimensions: Traditional and Religious Sources of Authority, Unmitigated Self-Interest, Communal Rationalism, and Subjective Spirituality. We hypothesize that: 1) political parties should be divided into conservative and socio-liberal parties, and this structure should become stable over time; 2) the evaluation of political parties should consistently reflect their political ideology orientation : conservative parties should be related to an indicator of conservative ideology, Traditional Religiosity, while socio-liberal parties should be related to a humanistic ideological orientation, Communal Rationalism. Data was collected in three time-points: 2010 ($N = 102$), 2014/15 ($N = 358$) and 2016 ($N = 117$) from university students in Serbia. In all three studies principal component analyses of evaluations of political parties showed that two components were extracted and interpreted as evaluations of the National-Conservative Parties and Socio-Liberal Parties (in 2010 and 2014), i.e. Democratic parties (in 2016). However, while the structure of evaluations of the National-Conservative Parties remained stable, the congruence of evaluations of the Socio-Liberal Parties decreased over time. Additionally, the results of regression analyses showed that evaluations of the National-Conservative Parties were rooted in Traditional and Religious Sources of Authority and Unmitigated

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Self-interest, but the percentage of explained variance decreased over time. The evaluations of the Socio-Liberal Parties had much weaker relations with ideological orientations throughout all three time-points. The findings suggested that there was some kind of "ideological crisis" in Serbia, primarily regarding the Socio-Liberal Parties and their supporters.

Keywords: political parties, political ideology, lexical approach, temporal changes

Although the multiparty political system in Serbia was established in 1990 (Bieber, 2003), a wider democratic process started since the year 2000, ten years after the beginning of democratization in other post-communist countries in Europe, including some of the former Yugoslav countries (Bochsler, 2010). During this relatively short period, political parties in Serbia, as Pantić (2006) wrote, “were unusually multiplied, divided, merged and disappeared” and often changed their ideologies (however, this trend was not that different in comparison to the majority of other East European countries). Within this context, Serbian citizens, even active voters of political parties in Serbia, were faced with difficulties regarding the establishment of a relatively stable ideological profile as voters of some of the political parties, or, at least, with the establishment of clear associations between their own ideological orientation and the ideology of the political party which they supported. However, there were research which showed that, the differentiation in ideological orientations of political parties and their supporters in Serbia increased from the beginning of the 1990s to the middle years of the previous decade (Pantić & Pavlović, 2006; Todosijević, 2006), and political parties dominantly reflected two opposing ideological dimensions: national-conservative and socio-liberal or democratic (e.g., Mihajlović, 2006; Međedović & Petrović, 2013; Todosijević, 2016). In this paper, we were focused on the analysis of the common ideological space of six political parties: Serbian Progressive Party (Srpska Napredna Stranka – SNS), Serbian Radical Party (Srpska Radikalna Stranka – SRS), Serbian Democratic Party (Demokratska Stranka Srbije – DSS), Serbian Socialist Party (Socijalistička Partija Srbije – SPS), Liberal-Democratic Party (Liberalno Demokratska Partija – LDP) and Democratic Party (Demokratska Stranka – DS). Our goal was to explore changes in their structure. and their relations with broad, lexically derived ideological dimensions over the last seven years.

Political parties in Serbia: Current situation

When this research was started in 2010, the political parties that constituted the majority in Serbian Parliament were SRS, DSS, LDP, DS, SPS, SNS. All political parties except LDP and SNS were formed during the 1990s. Most of them dated back to the beginning of the multiparty political system in Serbia during the first years of the 1990s (it is important to note that the leaders of LDP and SNS are also familiar faces from the 1990s). These political parties have been the most influential up until and including the present-day Serbian political scene.

The common issues addressed in the programs of all the parties were social and economical issues, attitudes towards Kosovo, accession to the European Union, etc. These issues were also the central topics for all political parties during the last national elections in Serbia (Spasojević, 2017). The explicitly postulated political goals of SRS (the right-wing nationalist party; Stojiljković, 2011), DSS and NS (the right-wing conservative parties) were related primarily to the preserva-

tion of the territorial integrity of Serbia and its cultural identity, including retaining Kosovo as a part of Serbia. Also, they advocated against the accession to the European Union. DS (with socio-liberal ideology), G17 Plus (the liberal party), SPS (the left authoritarian party) and SNS (the populist conservative party formed by separation from the conservative nationalistic SRS in 2008) advocated a middle ground option that consolidated both the accession to the EU and the preservation of the territorial integrity of Serbia. The LDP is the only party that explicitly advocates the acceptance of Kosovo independence, prompts accession of Serbia to the EU, and is generally more open to liberal values.

Bearing in mind the political goals of the parties, their postulated ideological orientations, and shifted the political power of the parties, it could be interesting to consider the relations of the political parties, especially in the context of their ideologies. In the period before 2010, Mihajlović (2006) found that the common space of preferences of the political parties could be described by two components. The first component was interpreted as the liberal-democratic block, and this component was saturated with the preferences of DS, LDP, G17 Plus, Serbian Renewal Movement (Srpski pokret obnove, SPO), and Socio-Democratic Union. SPS, SRS, NS, and "Power of Serbia" Movement ("Pokret Snaga Srbije") loaded on the second principal component, interpreted as the socio-nationalistic block. DSS saturated both principal components. Mihajlović (2006) also noted that the traditionalistic value patterns were characteristic for supporters of the socio-nationalistic parties, while voters of the liberal-democratic parties were characterized dominantly by modernistic value orientations.

Similarly, Mededović and Petrović (2013) analyzed the preferences of political parties which were in Serbian Parliament in 2010: DSS, DS, SRS, SPS, SNS, NS, LDP and G17 Plus. They also found that the two-component solution best described their common space: SRS, DSS, NS, and SNS saturated the component named preferences of the National-Conservative parties, but LDP, DS and G17 Plus constituted the component interpreted as preferences of the Socio-Liberal parties. Differing from the Mihajlović's (2006) results, SPS loaded both principal components.

Both research results practically supported and extended the findings of the study conducted by Todosijević (2006), where he compared the preferences of the main political parties in Serbia from the beginning of the 1990s to 2002. He also concluded that political parties (and their voters) could be divided between the authoritarian (SPS and SRS) and democratic (other political parties, with DS and DSS as leaders) blocks. The first block was characterized by a mixture of socialistic and nationalistic ideology (in 1990, nationalism and socialism were opposed to each other, in 1996 they were unrelated, while since the beginning of the 2000s nationalism and socialism have been positively related). Political parties from the democratic block were on the opposite side of the social-nationalistic ideology orientation.

Relations of political parties' preferences and ideological dimensions

Regarding political ideology, some authors make a distinction between two types of ideology: the ideology of party supporters and the ideology of political parties (e.g., Mihajlović, 2006). These two types of ideology are often complementary, and political parties tend to reflect the ideology of party supporters through the party ideology (Dalton & McAllister, 2015). These authors also argue that the first type of ideology is relatively stable, while the second one is flexible, more often in the sense that political parties change and adapt their ideologies in order to gain a broader range of supporters, generalizing their ideology to fit all of the particular ideologies of their potential voters (Adams, Clark, Ezrow, & Glasgow, 2004). Jost (2006) pointed out that early political parties, before the 1950s, were focused on ideology, which was followed by "the end of ideology" – de-ideologization of the political parties and convergence of their points of view. The hypothesis about "the end of ideology" is also supported by Converse's (1964) findings that the social attitudes of ordinary citizens are characterized by a lack of logical consistency and internal coherence, and that they are not organized in a systematic form that could be called ideology. However, more recently, Jost (2006) argued, based on the comprehensive analysis of the empirical findings primarily in psychology, that dispositional variables like personality traits and social attitudes have influence on an individual's political behavior, and that, in this context, ideology should be studied as a relatively stable socio-psychological phenomenon. Social attitudes, i.e. ideological dimensions (Krauss, 2006) have the greatest effects in predicting political behavior: party preference, voting behavior, etc. (Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009). For example, the right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation and nationalism are good predictors of specific forms of political behavior, such as providing support to the right-wing parties, voting for the right-wing parties in the past, and the intention of voting in future elections (Duckitt & Sibley, 2016; Wilson & Sibley, 2013).

For the purpose of this study, the research on the relationship between social attitudes and political behavior in Serbia is especially interesting. Probably the most informative overview of the relationship between social attitudes and voting preferences was given by Pantić and Pavlović (2006), analyzing the relationship between a party affiliation and the system of values, and social attitudes during the period between 1990 and 2005. Their main conclusion was that at the beginning of the multiparty political period in Serbia, voters of different parties, especially those from the parties which were dominant, were relatively poorly differentiated when it came to their attitudinal orientation. However, already during the next elections (in 1992) there was an ideological differentiation. Supporters of DS, DSS and SPO showed a mixture of nationalistic and liberal-democratic attitudes, while the main feature of the voters of SPS and SRS was traditionalism.

The situation became even clearer since the mid-nineties. Xenophobia, nationalism, radicalism, authoritarianism, statism, and traditionalism became dis-

tinctive attitudinal characteristics of the voters of SPS and SRS, while the voters of DS, DSS, and SPO were characterized by modernism, non-authoritarianism, and rejection of radicalism, nationalism and statism. This division of the electorate survived even after the democratic changes in 2000, leading to the so-called "socio-nationalistic" block, consisting of voters of SPS and SRS, and the "democratic" block, consisting of voters of DS, DSS, and SPO, and later joined by the newly formed parties, like G17 Plus, LDP, and so on. It was very interesting that, despite clear polarization in the ideological orientation between the two blocks, religiosity was practically a constant characteristic of voters of all the parties, and its influence and importance progressively increased. There were also other studies that supported the hypothesis about the ideological polarization of voters of political parties from two blocks, conservative and democratic, i.e. socio-liberal, with very similar findings (e.g., Mihić, 2005; Todosijević, 2006, 2016). The study conducted by Todosijević (2016) showed that only the affiliation of SPS was weakly negatively related to the political left-right self-placement. The affiliation of SNS, SRS and DSS, as parties that were known for their social conservatism and nationalist orientation, were weakly positively related to the political left-right self-placement. However, the affiliation of DS and LDP was also weakly positively related to the political left-right self-identification. Compared with his previous studies, Todosijević (2016) concluded that the impact of the left-right ideological dimension on understanding the affiliation of political parties in Serbia decreased over time.

Political parties' preferences and lexically derived ideological dimensions

Starting from the lexical paradigm as a reference framework which should ensure comprehensiveness and representativeness of the sample of social attitudes, Saucier (2000, 2013) has formulated a structural model of basic ideological dimensions, based on dictionary terms that have the suffix *-ism*, and refer to social phenomena (for more detailed information about the lexical ideological dimensions see Petrović, 2016). Primarily, Saucier (2000) found four broad ideological dimensions: α -isms or Tradition-Oriented Religiosity, which represented confidence in the traditional and religious sources of authority; β -isms or Unmitigated Self-Interest appeared as materialistic, egoistical and selfish motives, as well as the rejection of political correctness, and the existing political system; γ -isms or Communal Rationalism represented positive attitudes towards common institutions which guaranteed individual freedom and respect of democratic values; δ -isms or Subjective Spirituality were spiritual attitudes based on individualism and beliefs in "paranormal" phenomena. In his second study, Saucier (2013) replicated these four ideological dimensions and found an additional fifth one, interpreted as ϵ -isms, Inequality-Aversion or simply Egalitarianism.

There were only few studies which explored relationships among the lexical ideological dimensions. However, these studies suggested that lexically derived ideological dimensions could be important for the understanding of political behavior and political preferences. Saucier (2013) reported that, in the USA, Tradition-Oriented Religiosity was positively associated with the preferences of the Republican Party, while democrats were characterized by higher Communal Rationalism, Subjective Spirituality and Egalitarianism. It was important to note that Saucier also found that ideological dimensions did not contribute to the prediction of change in the party preference, except Tradition-Oriented Religiosity, which suggested that people high on this ideological dimension did tend to become more republican over time. Especially interesting were the results of the research conducted in Serbia, in which the relationship of lexical ideological dimensions and preferences of Serbian political parties was examined (Međedović & Petrović, 2013). This research showed that Tradition Oriented Religiosity was associated with the preferences of national-conservative political parties (SRS, DSS, SNS and NS), and that Hedonism (redefined Unmitigated Self-Interest) was associated with the preferences of both national-conservative and socio-liberal (LDP, DS, G17 plus) political parties. Interestingly, the expected correlation between the preferences of socio-liberal parties and Communal Rationalism was not detected.

The current study

The complexity of the political situation in Serbia is reflected in the insufficiently differentiated political options, in terms of noncompliance of programs and practical functioning of the political parties, as well as in the ambiguity of the ideological positions of the parties and their supporters. However, some research suggested that, from the beginning of the 1990s, political parties and their voters became ideologically more differentiated. These findings imply that political parties and their supporters may have clearer ideological positions today than in the previous period. Following these findings, we explored the stability of relations between evaluations of Serbian political parties and lexically derived ideological dimensions over time. We tested two hypotheses: 1) political parties should be divided into conservative and democratic, socio-liberal parties, and the latent structure of the evaluations of political parties should be stable over time; 2) the evaluation of the political parties should consistently reflect the orientation of their political ideology: evaluations of the conservative parties should be associated with indicators of conservative ideology, primarily traditional religiosity, and the self-interest as well, while democratic, socio-liberal parties should be related to a humanistic ideological orientation (Communal Rationalism and possibly Subjective Spirituality).

Method

Sample

Data was collected in three time-points, from three different convenience samples of university students in Serbia: 2010 ($N = 102$; 65% were female, mean age was 23.14, $SD = 3.85$), 2014/15 ($N = 358$; 72% were female, mean age was 23.01, $SD = 5.97$) and 2016 ($N = 117$; 82% were female, mean age was 22.95, $SD = 3.70$). The samples were selected on a voluntary basis. The students were motivated to participate by additional points they acquired on a psychology course they attended.

Measures

Evaluation of the political parties. In order to measure the evaluation of the political parties in all three time-points, we asked the respondents the following question: "How do you assess the general work of the following political parties?" They submitted their responses on a five point scale, where 1 was marked as *very poor* and 5 as *very good*. Previous research showed that this single question, which measures a performance of the parties, rather than feelings towards parties, is a valid measure of party evaluation (Kuzmanović & Petrović, 2010; Mededović & Petrović, 2013). The six major political parties in Serbia were evaluated: SNS, SRS, DSS, SPS, LDP and DS. The descriptive characteristics and bivariate correlations of evaluations of the political parties can be seen in the Table 1.

Ideological dimensions. Four lexically derived ideological dimensions: α -isms or Traditional and Religious Sources of Authority (TRA), β -isms or Unmitigated Self-Interest (USI), γ -isms or Communal Rationalism (CR) and δ -isms or Subjective Spirituality (SS) were measured via Survey on Dictionary-Based Isms (SDI; Saucier, 2008, 2013). Three different measures were used: SDI-24 in 2010, SDI-46 in 2014/15, and SDI-25 in 2016. All three SDI measures had a 5-point Likert's scale for responding, where 1 stands for *completely disagree*, and 5 for *completely agree*. The descriptive characteristics and reliabilities for all three scales and their inter-correlation matrices can be seen in Table 1.

Results

Relationships between evaluations of political parties and lexical ideological dimensions

The simple relationships between all examined variables (the evaluations of political parties and lexical ideological dimensions) in all three time-points were investigated by using the bivariate correlations (Table 1).

Table 1
Bivariate correlations between evaluations of Serbian political parties and ideological dimensions

Year		M	SD	α	Correlations									
					DS	DSS	SRS	SPS	LDP	SNS	TRA	USI	CR	
2010 (N = 102)	DS	3.03	1.13	/	1									
	DSS	2.85	.96	/	.11	1								
	SRS	2.46	1.14	/	-.03	.46**	1							
	SPS	2.30	1.08	/	.31**	.21*	.24*	1						
	LDP	2.14	1.17	/	.49**	-.07	-.20*	.17†	1					
	SNS	2.90	1.24	/	-.12	.50**	.54**	.19†	-.18†	1				
	TRA	3.41	0.93	.76	-.06	.24*	.36**	.08	-.22*	.15	1			
	USI	2.61	0.68	.72	.22*	.20*	.46**	.41**	-.02	.32**	.19*	1		
	CR	4.03	0.35	.59	-.03	.06	.14	.14	-.09	.15	.06	-.06	1	
SS	3.19	0.57	.63	-.16	-.13	-.05	-.08	.20*	-.06	-.01	-.22*	.07		
2014/15 (N = 358)	DS	2.28	0.96	/	1									
	DSS	2.23	0.99	/	.44**	1								
	SRS	2.19	1.10	/	.31**	.59**	1							
	SPS	2.30	1.03	/	.48**	.51**	.47**	1						
	LDP	2.40	1.03	/	.58**	.33**	.16**	.38**	1					
	SNS	2.31	1.21	/	.37**	.48**	.35**	.61**	.31**	1				
	TRA	2.70	0.94	.85	.03	.22**	.30**	.23**	-.1	.34**	1			
	USI	2.31	0.63	.74	-.01	.13*	.28**	.16**	-.06	.14**	.44**	1		
	CR	3.36	0.43	.62	.11	.08	-.04	.11	.15**	.15**	-.1	-.15*	1	
SS	2.99	0.69	.70	-.02	.11	.02	-.02	.02	.12	.23**	.04	-.12		
2016 (N = 117)	DS	1.71	0.87	/	1									
	DSS	1.62	0.8	/	.55**	1								
	SRS	1.59	0.94	/	.36**	.50**	1							
	SPS	2.03	1.07	/	.37**	.47**	.32**	1						
	LDP	1.55	0.82	/	.70**	.46**	.26**	.35**	1					
	SNS	2.19	1.31	/	.16†	.37**	.39**	.56**	.29**	1				
	TRA	2.86	0.66	.73	-.04	.11	.32**	.20**	-.03	.24**	1			
	USI	2.38	0.76	.72	.14	.04	-.02	-.02	.19*	.13	.13*	1		
	CR	3.94	0.60	.66	-.02	-.05	-.01	.01	-.14	.06	-.02	-.02	1	
SS	3.34	0.76	.69	.13	.1	.05	.15	.24*	.00	-.03	.09	.05		

Note. DS = Demokratska Stranka (Democratic Party); DSS = Demokratska Stranka Srbije (Serbian Democratic Party); SRS = Srpska Radikalna Stranka (Serbian Radical Party); SPS = Socijalistička Partija Srbije (Serbian Socialist Party); LDP = Liberalno Demokratska Partija (Liberal-Democratic Party); SNS = Srpska Napredna Stranka (Serbian Progressive Party); TRA = Traditional and Religious Sources of Authority; USI = Unmitigated Self-Interest; CR = Communal Rationalism; SS = Subjective Spirituality.

† $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

As can be seen, in 2010, the evaluations of political parties from similar ideological positions correlated positively (e.g. DSS, SRS and SNS, as well as DS and LDP), but evaluations of the parties from the opposite side of the ideological spectrum correlated negatively, (e.g. LDP with SRS and SNS), or there were no significant correlations (e.g. DS with SNS, SRS or DSS). However, in 2014 and 2016, the magnitude of correlations between the evaluations of all examined parties was higher, and all of them were positive.

Weak to moderate correlations were detected mainly between the national-conservative parties and Traditional and Religious Sources of authority and Unmitigated Self-Interest in all three time-points. SNS and SPS had similar patterns of change in their associations with ideological dimensions: in 2010, these parties correlated moderately with Unmitigated Self-Interest, while later, in 2014, their ideologies were colored by a combination of Traditionalism and Communal Rationalism, especially in the case of SNS. Finally, in 2016, only correlations with Traditional and Religious Sources of Authority were detected. Expected correlations between the positive evaluation of the socio-liberal parties and Communal Rationalism were not detected. In the case of DS, the only correlation with Unmitigated Self-Interest was identified in 2010, with no significant correlations in 2014 and 2016. There was no stable ideological profile of LDP. It shifted from the anti-traditionalistic ideology, across advocating values of the civic state, toward materialistic self-interest followed by subjective spirituality.

Latent structure and temporal stability of political party evaluation

The latent structure of evaluations of the six political parties was analysed by the Principal Component Analysis (PCA), separately for each of the three time-points. The optimal number of components was obtained by parallel analysis. The extracted components were rotated in the promax position. The results of the PCA are presented in Figure 1.

In all three cases, the results of the PCA indicated that the common space of the evaluation of Serbian political parties could be optimally explained by two extracted components. In 2010, two extracted components explained about 64% of variance in total (eigenvalue of the first component was, $\lambda_1 = 2.15$, and it explained 36% of the variance; the second component had eigenvalue $\lambda_2 = 1.69$, and explained an additional 28% of the variance; random eigenvalues for these components were 1.36 and 1.18). The correlation between these two components was $r = -.01$. The first component was saturated by the positive evaluation of SRS, SNS and DSS, interpreted as the national-conservative parties (NCP). DS and LDP were loaded on the second component, interpreted as the socio-liberal parties (SLP). SPS had saturation on both components, but primarily the component interpreted it as socio-liberal.

After the elections in 2014, the same six political parties were evaluated again, and two components, practically identical to the ones from 2010, were extracted.

These two explained about 70% of the total variance. The first component ($\lambda_1 = 3.19$, 53% of variance explained; random eigenvalue was 1.18) was saturated by the positive evaluation of SRS, DSS and SNS, and interpreted as the national-conservative parties. The second one ($\lambda_2 = 1.03$, 17% of variance explained; random eigenvalue was 1.01) was interpreted as the socio-liberal block, and saturated by the positive evaluation of DS and LDP. The SPS again loaded both components, but primarily the first, national-conservative component. However, in difference from 2010, these two components correlated more strongly ($r = .47$).

In 2016, two principal components were also extracted, which explained 69% of the common variance of the evaluations of political parties. However, some changes in the structure of the components were made (the parallel analysis showed that random eigenvalues for the first two components were 1.32 and 1.16). The first principal component ($\lambda_1 = 2.96$, 49% of the variance explained) could be interpreted as national-conservative, and it was saturated dominantly by the positive evaluation of SNS, SRS and SPS, which had no saturation on the second component. DSS also saturated this component, but had a strong saturation on the second component as well, together with DS and LDP. This second component ($\lambda_2 = 1.24$, 21% of variance explained) was interpreted, not as socio-liberal, but rather as the democratic block. These two principal components also correlated strongly ($r = .38$).

The results of the PCA suggested some stability over time in the evaluation of some political parties. DS and LDP on one side, and SRS and SNS on the other side. However, the results also suggested that SPS and DSS could change their position in the common space of the scene of political parties over time. Graphical representations of the extracted components in all time-points are presented on Figure 1.

In order to additionally test the hypothesis about the temporal stability of the structure of evaluation of political parties, i.e. the stability of the two extracted principal components, there were calculated the coefficients of congruence between them. The coefficients of congruence between the national-conservative components were .97, .91 and .90, but among the socio-liberal components they were .93, .87 and .79, for the periods 2010–2014/15, 2010–2016 and 2014–2016, respectively.




Figure 1. Evaluation of political parties in 2010, 2014 and 2016: rotated components in two-dimensional space. DS = Demokratska Stranka (Democratic Party); DSS = Demokratska Stranka Srbije (Serbian Democratic Party); SRS = Srpska Radikalna Stranka (Serbian Radical Party); SPS = Socijalistička Partija Srbije (Serbian Socialist Party); LDP = Liberalno Demokratska Partija (Liberal-Democratic Party); SNS = Srpska Napredna Stranka (Serbian Progressive Party). White dots: Socio-Liberal Parties; Black dots: National-Conservative Parties; Gray dots: parties with loadings > .30 on both components.

Relationship between political parties' evaluation and ideological dimensions

The set of the linear regression analysis, separately for the each of the time-points, was performed with the aim to explore the stability of relations between evaluations of Serbian political parties and lexically derived ideological dimensions over time. In all three cases, the two components of the evaluation of the political parties extracted by PCA and saved by the regression method were entered as the criterion variables. The four lexically derived ideological dimensions were entered as the predictor variables, controlled for gender and age. The results are shown in Tables 2 and 3.

As can be seen in Table 2, regression models have shown that lexically derived ideological dimensions were important predictors of the evaluation of the National-Conservative parties. All three regression functions containing demographic variables and lexically derived ideological dimensions were statistically significant. A traditional and religious source of authority was the most important predictor of the positive evaluations of the National-Conservative parties throughout all three time-points. Unmitigated Self-Interest also had a significant role in the prediction of evaluations of the National-Conservative parties in 2010 and 2014. It is very important to note that the percentage of the criterion's variance explained by the set of predictors decreased significantly over time.

Table 2

Results of linear regression analysis: Prediction of the evaluations of National-Conservative parties by lexical ideological dimensions

	2010		2014		2016	
	β	r	β	r	β	r
Gender	-.07	-.04	.07	.01	-.02	-.03
Age	-.11	-.07	-.20**	-.27**	-.10	-.12
TRA	.27**	.34**	.28**	.37**	.31**	.30**
USI	.32**	.42**	.15**	.28**	-.02	.04
CR	.12	.18*	.11	-.02	.05	.02
SS	-.09	-.13*	.04	.13*	.11	.08
R^2	.27**		.20**		.11*	

Note. TRA = Traditional and Religious Sources of Authority; USI = Unmitigated Self-Interest; CR = Communal Rationalism; SS = Subjective Spirituality.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

Table 3

Results of linear regression analysis: Prediction of the evaluations of Socio-Liberal/Democratic parties by lexical ideological dimensions

	2010		2014		2016	
	β	r	β	r	β	r
Gender	.21*	.24**	.13*	.12*	.07	.10
Age	.01	-.12	-.1	-.07	-.01	-.07
TRA	-.17	-.12	.02	.01	.01	.00
USI	.26*	.22**	.03	.01	.12	.14
CR	-.01	-.01	.17*	.13*	-.07	-.08
SS	.08	.01	.02	.01	.17*	.19*
R^2	.13*		.05*		.06	

Note. TRA = Traditional and Religious Sources of Authority; USI = Unmitigated Self-Interest; CR = Communal Rationalism; SS = Subjective Spirituality.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

When predicting the evaluations of the Socio-liberal/Democratic parties, the percentage of the criterion variance explained by the set of predictors also significantly decreased throughout the three time-points (Table 3). It is also important to note that, in this case, the predictor variables explained a significantly lower percentage of variance of the criterion than in the case of evaluations of the National-Conservative parties (in 2016, ideological dimensions had no significant contribution in the explanation of the criterion). Only in 2014, the positive correlation between Communal Rationalism and evaluation of the Socio-liberal/Democratic parties was detected.

Discussion

Since the establishment of the pluralistic political system in Serbia in the early 1990s, the political parties “were unusually multiplied, divided, merged and disappeared” (Pantić, 2006), with change in their political ideology, or often despite it. This trend with political parties, and with their supporters as well, continued over the last few years. However, the previous research (Mededović & Petrović, 2013; Mihajlović, 2006; Pantić & Pavlović, 2006; Todosijević, 2006) showed that there was a tendency since the beginning of the 1990s for political parties and their supporters in Serbia to be divided within two ideological blocks. The first of them was comprised of political parties with conservative, nationalist and left-wing authoritarian ideological orientations (dominantly SPS and SRS during the 1990s and early 2000s, and DSS after the elections in 2008). The sec-

and one reflected a democratic and socio-liberal ideological orientation (with DS and DSS during the 1990s, and DS, LDP and G17 Plus since the beginning of the year 2000). In this study, we analyzed the latent structure of evaluations of the six most influential political parties in Serbia, which had continuity over time: SPS, SRS, DS, DSS, LDP and SNS, in the context of their temporal stability. We focused on the period after 2010 for two reasons: firstly, there were already studies which analyzed the structure of the political parties preferences in the previous period (e.g., Mihajlović, 2006; Todosijević, 2006), but not in the recent years. Secondly, after 2010, more precisely after the national elections in 2012, there has been a very important shift in the political power of political parties in Serbia, with democratic parties moving to the opposition, while SNS and SPS formed the Government. Analyses of the latent structure of the evaluation of political parties in the three time-points, 2010, 2014/15 and 2016, by conducting the PCA in this study showed that this cleavage of evaluations of the political parties continued to exist in 2010, and in an interpretative manner in 2014 as well. In both time-points, two principal components were extracted and interpreted as positive evaluations of the national-conservative (SRS, DSS, SNS) and socio-liberal block (DS and LDP), following the terminology proposed in the previous research (Međedović & Petrović, 2013; Stojiljković, 2011), with SPS that loaded both components. However, a shift occurred in 2016: although only two parties (SPS and DSS) changed the components which they previously dominantly loaded, the interpretation of the components was significantly different than in the previous two time-points. Namely, the first component could be interpreted as the national-conservative block (SNS, SPS, SRS, and partly DSS), but the second one could be interpreted as the democratic block (DS, LDP, and partly DSS), following the terminology of Pantić and Pavlović (2006). These two components not only reflected changes in the structure of the evaluation of dominant political parties in the meaning of their ideologies, which implied some kind of the return to the past, but the similar structures of party preferences were detected during the 1990s and early 2000s (Mihajlović, 2006; Todosijević, 2006). They reflected the government-opposition polarization. Although the similar structure was detected in the previous period, when the socio-liberal parties governed (2010), and when they moved to the opposition, the extracted components showed some stability over time. We detected relatively high coefficients of congruence from the period from 2010 to 2014. The structure was less congruent, or even incongruent in comparison to the period from 2014 to 2016 and from 2010 to 2016. It is important to note that the two-component structure was detected in all three time-points despite the fact that, differing from 2010, in 2014 and 2016 all political parties were evaluated *mostly negatively*: we believe that this is the reason for positive zero-order correlations between evaluations of parties from different ideological dimensions. Based on the evaluations of political parties, these results suggested that the party ideology was not the primary reason for their coalitions, but rather their endeavor to govern, similar to the period of the 1990s, when the majority in the Serbian parlia-

ment was constituted by SPS and SRS, the parties with conceptually hard-to-join socialistic and nationalistic ideologies.

Previous interpretations have been additionally confirmed when the analysis of relationships between political parties evaluations and ideological dimensions are taken into consideration. Analysis of the relations between the evaluation of political parties and lexically driven ideological dimensions showed that, as expected, people's evaluations of the national-conservative parties were rooted primarily in traditional and religious sources of authority (similarly as Saucier (2013) reported for the Republicans), but were also motivated by the unmitigated, materialistic self-interest. However, the magnitude of the relations between the political parties and lexical ideological dimensions decreased over time. Only traditionalistic attitudinal patterns remained constant. Socio-liberal, i.e. democratic parties had no stable relations with lexical ideological dimensions, in the sense that they were ideologically undefined or, at least, that their ideology was not recognized by the Serbian citizens. These results are in line with the findings of Todosijević (2016). Considering the relations of the political left-right self-placement and sympathies for the Serbian political parties, he found that except SPS, all other political parties, including DS and LDP, were weakly positively associated with the political left-right self-identification. He concluded that the impact of the left-right ideological dimension on understanding sympathies for political parties in Serbia decreased over time. Similarly, we should also conclude that the magnitude of associations between the evaluations of political parties and ideological dimensions decreased over time, with the addition that evaluations of the socio-liberal democratic parties had no roots in the respondents' positions on ideological dimensions. The findings generally suggest that some kind of "ideological crisis" is being faced by citizens in Serbia, primarily within the supporters of Socio-Liberal/Democratic parties.

Two more arguments in favor of the hypothesis about the ideological crisis of the political parties in Serbia arise from the findings of this research. The first of them regards the relations of the evaluations of political parties and Unmitigated Self-Interest. Namely, primarily the conservative parties, as well as the socio-liberal ones, in 2010, when this political block governed, were related to the Unmitigated Self-Interest, as dimensions from the lexical ideology corpus. These findings suggested that, beside traditionalistic values, supporters of these political parties were motivated by materialistic, selfish motives to support their parties, and it seemed that the voters believed that the important part of politics was the orientation towards self-interest, without paying attention to the needs and views of others (Mededović & Petrović, 2013). These results became clearer when it was taken into consideration that some authors argued that the organizational structure of political parties in Serbia in the recent years have been expressed in an oligarchic syndrome, corruption and clientelism (Cvejić, 2016; Kovačević, 2015). The results of this study also showed that in 2010, the correlation between two extracted components was close to zero, which suggested the independence

of these two components, but also the dissatisfaction of participants with both socio-liberal and national-conservative parties. However, in 2014/15 and 2016, the two extracted components correlated more highly, about .50. A positive correlation between two factors which we obtained in 2014/15 and 2016 did not mean that the respondents who positively evaluated conservative parties had a positive evaluation of socio-liberal/democratic parties as well. On the contrary, the respondents expressed a deep *dissatisfaction* with both groups of parties (these findings were supported by the descriptive and bivariate correlations between the political parties in all three time-points, see Table 1). Pavlović (2013) showed that the best predictors of the youth electoral absenteeism were a decreased level of party identification, political interests, and the formal activism. As it is shown, we have also found that our respondents generally negatively evaluated all political parties in all time-points, increasingly over time. The undefined ideological positions of the political parties, especially the socio-liberal/democratic parties, and the significant role of materialistic self-interest, could be some of the reasons for it. However, it is an issue that could be investigated in some further research.

In this context, the sample structure as the crucial limitation of this study, must be emphasized. Namely, in all three time-points, the samples dominantly consisted of young, educated, primarily female respondents. It could be doubly implicative for understanding the main findings of this research – the associations between evaluations of the national-conservative parties and traditional and religious sources of authority as ideological dimension, as well as the lack of the expected associations between Communal Rationalism and evaluations of the Socio-Liberal/Democratic parties. Concretely, some recent research of the gender gap in voting preferences (e.g., Abendschön & Steinmetz, 2014) has shown that women, in comparison to men, prefer the left-wing political parties in most of the European countries, except in the former-communist transitional countries where women's preferences for the right-wing parties have been detected. Our findings could be in line with the Abendschön and Steinmetz (2014) findings, and thus the findings should be treated carefully in the meaning of their generalizability. Hence, these findings could be replicated on more gender-balanced samples.

The results of this study have generally shown that it could be assumed that there is an ideological crisis, or, even better, a crisis of the political parties (Kovačević, 2015) that reflects on the way citizens see them. Avoidance of the "catch-all" (Mihajlović, 2006) approach and clearer ideological positioning, not only through their political programs, but also through their political activities which reflected their ideological orientations, could be a strategy which could reduce the negative evaluation of all political parties, regardless of their ideological orientations, but primarily socio-liberal/democratic ones.

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**TEMPORALNE PROMENE U EVALUACIJI
POLITIČKIH STRANAKA:
DA LI EVALUACIJA POLITIČKIH STRANAKA
ODRAŽAVA IDEOLOŠKE STAVOVE?**

Kompleksnost političke situacije u Srbiji ogleda se u nedovoljno izdiferenciranim političkim opcijama, u smislu neusklađenosti programa i praktičnog funkcionisanja političkih partija, kao i u dvosmislenosti njihovih ideoloških pozicija. Međutim, neka istraživanja sugerisu da su od početka 1990-ih političke partije postale ideološki sve više izdiferencirane. Ova istraživanja su ukazivala na to da političke partije i njihove pristalice mogu imati jasnije ideološke stavove u odnosu na prethodni period. Oslanjajući se na rezultate ovih istraživanja, ispitali smo stabilnost odnosa između evaluacija političkih stranaka u Srbiji i leksički deriviranih ideoloških dimenzija tokom perioda 2010-2016. Testirali smo dve hipoteze: 1) političke stranke mogu se podeliti na konzervativne i demokratske partije, a latentna struktura evaluacije političkih stranaka trebalo bi da bude stabilna tokom vremena; 2) evaluacija političkih stranaka će dosledno odražavati političku ideologiju – konzervativne partije će korelirati sa indikatorima konzervativne ideologije kao što su Tradicionalni i religiozni izvori autoriteta, dok će partije iz demokratskog bloka biti povezane sa humanističkom ideološkom orijentacijom. Podaci o evaluaciji političkih partija prikupljeni su u tri vremenske tačke na tri različita uzorka: 2010 ($N = 102$), 2014/15 ($N = 358$) i 2016 ($N = 117$) u Srbiji. Ispitanici su bili studenti različitih univerziteta u Srbiji. U sve tri vremenske tačke, ispitali smo odnose između evaluacija najuticajnijih političkih partija u Srbiji (DSS, DS, SRS, SPS, SNS i LDP) i leksički deriviranih ideoloških dimenzija: Tradicionalnih i religioznih izvora autoriteta, Sebičnih interesa, Komunalnog racionalizma (humanizma) i Subjektivne spiritualnosti.

U sve tri vremenske tačke, analiza glavnih komponenata evaluacije političkih stranaka pokazala je da se mogu ekstrahovati dve komponente, koje su interpretirane kao nacionalno-konzervativnii socio-liberalni blok (u 2010 i 2014 godini), odnosno, nacionalno-konzervativni i demokratski blok (2016. godine). Koeficijenti kongruence između nacionalno-konzervativnih faktora bili su .97, .91 i .90, a među socio-liberalnim faktorima .93, .87 i .79, redom za periode 2010–2014/15, 2010–2016 i 2014–2016. Linearna regresiona analiza pokazala je da ideološke dimenzije objašnjavaju 27%, 20% i 11% varijanse evaluacije nacionalno-konzervativnih

i 13% i 5% varijanse evaluacije socioliberalnih političkih partija redom za 2010, 2014 i 2016 godinu, s tim da poslednji (2016) model pedikcije evaluacije demokratskih stranaka ideološkim dimenzijama nije statistički značajan. Nacionalno-konzervativne partije praktično su ukorenjene u tradicionalnim i religioznim izvorima autoriteta i sebičnim interesima u sve tri vremenske tačke, dok socijalno-liberalne tj., demokratske stranke ne odražavaju jasnu ideološku orijentaciju.

Rezultati ovog istraživanja sugerišu da je evaluacija političkih stranaka ideološki sve manje izdiferenciranatokom vremena – u 2016. godini njihova struktura odražava pre vlast-opozicija polarizaciju nego ideološku konzervativno-liberalnu polarizaciju. Takođe, samo nacionalno-konzervativne stranke imaju jasniju ideološku pozadinu, dok su socijalno-liberalne (demokratske) stranke ideološki prekično nedefinisane. Nalazi sugerišu da postoji neka vrsta „ideološke krize“ u Srbiji, pre svega u kada su u pitanju socijalno-liberalne, tj. demokratske stranke i njihove pristalice.

Ključne reči: političke partije, politička ideologija, leksički pristup, promene tokom vremena

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**AUTHORITARIANISM AND COGNITIVE
POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT**

This study analyses the linkage between authoritarianism and three indicators that describe one's general cognitive orientation towards the world of politics: political knowledge, general interest in politics, and interest in the election campaign. Individuals high in authoritarianism are hypothesized to be less politically competent and less interested in politics, due to their resistance to adopting new information and to changing the adopted beliefs. This hypothesis is based on the classical description of the authoritarian personality, but it has not been adequately empirically verified yet. The data are taken from a post-election public opinion survey conducted in 2012 after the presidential and parliamentary elections, on a random sample of voting age citizens of Serbia ($N = 1568$). The results show that authoritarianism and the level of political knowledge are significantly and negatively correlated, even after controlling for the basic socio-demographic variables. The intensity of political interest is not significantly correlated with authoritarianism. Additional comparison of the misinformed and uninformed groups (those who provided incorrect answers, and those who answered "don't know", respectively) did not support the view that authoritarian persons are more inclined to erroneously guess an answer than to simply say "don't know". The study concludes that the association between political knowledge and authoritarianism is based on deeper psychological roots, while the (lack of) association with political interest is likely to be context-dependent.

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Since the publishing of the seminal work on authoritarian personality by Adorno and associates (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950), authoritarianism has become one of the most influential concepts in political psychology. The literature on authoritarianism describes highly authoritarian individuals as prejudiced and intolerant, prone to antidemocratic, non-egalitarian ideologies. Numerous empirical studies have shown the link between authoritarianism and ethnic (Adorno et al., 1950; Brown, 1965) and non-ethnic prejudice (Peterson, Doty, & Winter, 1993), nationalism (Todosijević, 2013), the militarist view on conflict resolution (Doty, Winter, Peterson, & Kimmelmeier, 1997), pro-capitalist attitudes, denial of freedom and human rights etc. (Altemeyer, 1981, 1988, 1996; McFarland, 2010; Meloen, 1993). In a nutshell, the extant evidence shows that authoritarian individuals hold specific views on social and political issues, which consequently determines their political preferences and behaviour.

The correlates of authoritarianism have mostly been sought (and found) in the field of attitudes towards various social and political issues (e.g., McFarland, 2010; Meloen, 1993). The relationship between authoritarianism and political cognition is, however, an under-researched area, although the topic is both theoretically and practically important. The literature on authoritarianism contains numerous references to specific features of political cognition and involvement among the highly authoritarian individuals that require empirical verification and further theoretical development. Yet, as Peterson et al. (Peterson, Duncan, & Pang, 2002) complained some time ago, "To date [...], no one has examined the amount of political *knowledge* possessed by someone scoring high on authoritarianism." (pp. 99–100, emphasis in original). Peterson et al. (2002) reported a negative association between the right-wing authoritarianism and both political knowledge and political interest among American university students.

The situation in the research field has not changed much meanwhile. The studies on authoritarianism and political involvement and interest are still scarce. In particular, research evidence from different political and cultural contexts, as well as the studies on large, probability samples, would be most welcome. This paper's contribution is in providing the lacking empirical evidence, using reliable measurement instruments and a large, probability-based sample. The evidence comes from Serbia, a still-democratizing country, with recent experience with authoritarian politics.

Authoritarianism and political involvement: The theoretical framework

"The Authoritarian Personality" (Adorno et al., 1950) contains numerous references to the authoritarians' view of the political world. Although Adorno and associates treated authoritarianism as a personality concept, and "personality may be regarded as a *determinant* of ideological preferences" (Adorno et al., 1950,

p. 5, italics in original), throughout the pages of “The Authoritarian Personality” there are explicit references to prominent political cynicism and aversion towards politics and politicians, as well as to political ignorance of highly authoritarian individuals. For instance, the interviews revealed, “widespread ignorance and confusion (...) in political matters, a phenomenon which might well surpass what even a skeptical observer should have anticipated” (Adorno et al., 1950, p. 658).

Moreover, a kind of an anti-political orientation is observed among the authoritarian respondents. Politicians and bureaucrats were perceived as “usurpers, parasites, know nothing about the people (...). The wealth of statements against bureaucrats and politicians in our interview material is tremendous.” (Adorno et al., 1950, pp. 693–694). Yet, it is not known to what extent such description, that is, political ignorance and disinterest in politics, fits the contemporary authoritarianism.

Authoritarian individuals appear as “apolitical animals” in Altemeyer’s outline of the right-wing authoritarianism as well. Altemeyer (1988) corroborates Adorno et al.’s view that authoritarianism leads to obedience to the authorities perceived to be legitimate (i.e., political passivity). However, he also emphasizes that right-wing authoritarianism “connects only moderately to the political preferences of ordinary people” (Altemeyer, 2007, p. 197), thus implying not only the lack of political interest, but also political *incompetence* – the difficulty in connecting one’s attitudes with political choices.

In some other conceptions, authoritarianism has been equaled with the quality of person’s cognitive functioning. Rokeach (1960) argued that dogmatism, a form of a belief system structure, could be understood as the general authoritarianism. Dogmatic persons are described as closed-minded, as individuals whose processing of political information is suboptimal. This line of reasoning emphasizes the importance not of the content of one’s beliefs, but of the cognitive structure – the biased acquisition, selection, and interpretation of information. This view is supported by empirical evidence that shows that more authoritarian/conservative individuals are less politically sophisticated (Tetlock, 1983), think less analytically (Talhelm et al., 2015) and show low cognitive complexity (Hinze, Doster, & Joe, 1997). Likewise, recent research on conservatism as motivated social cognition (Jost & Amodio, 2012; Jost, Kruglanski, Glaser, & Sulloway, 2003) also points in the direction of authoritarian political views being associated with the biased processing of political information.

In Adorno et al.’s conceptualization, authoritarianism is a personality disposition, and therefore causally prior to consequent deficient political knowledge and interest. The causal order could, however, be conceived differently. The authors themselves recognized that “there is a reason to believe that ignorance itself works in favour of general reactionary trends” (Adorno et al., 1950, p. 339). The claim is nicely illustrated with some interesting findings that Gordon Allport discusses in his classic work on prejudice (Allport, 1954). He argues of prejudiced people as being afraid to say “don’t know”. They need for definiteness and feel

secure when they “know” the answer, even if it means making erroneous guesses. Those higher on authoritarianism would demand a clear-cut structure of the social world; they are intolerant of uncertainty and “not knowing”, even if the alternative is an inadequate piece of information (Allport, 1954). Put simply, people higher on authoritarianism could be expected to be rather misinformed than uninformed, the difference which has evidenced political relevance (Kuklinski, Quirk, Jerit, Schweider, & Reich, 2000).

Similarly, Lipset (1959) argued that the firmly established link between low socioeconomic status and high authoritarian predispositions is moderated by the lack of political sophistication. The less sophisticated the individual, “the more likely he is to favour a simplified and demonological view of politics” (Lipset, 1959, p. 492). Put simply, the lack of information, among other things, predisposes a person to view politics in simplistic, “black and white” terms and to prefer extremist movements, quick and easy solutions to social problems – in other words, makes the person more prone to an authoritarian political outlook. A sort of a cognitive approach to authoritarianism or, as others suggested (Meloan, 1996), the lack-of-cognitive-understanding approach to the study of authoritarianism could be quite appropriate as well.

Indeed, if we look at political knowledge, it is typically described as something antithetical to authoritarianism. Numerous studies have shown that increased political knowledge is related to some of the most prominent features of a democratic political outlook, such as more active participation in various political activities (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Inglehart, 1979; Klingemann, 1979; Krampen, 2000; Pavlović, 2012; 2013a) and increased political tolerance (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Pavlović, 2012). Some argue that political knowledge is “to democratic politics what money is to economics: it is the currency of citizenship” (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996, p. 8). Knowledgeable individuals are supposed to make more informed and rational political decisions, to monitor political process more closely and “press” political authorities to be more accountable and responsible. Such activities are quite the opposite of what is to be expected of an authoritarian personality.

Political knowledge and interest are often viewed as key components of democratic political competences, while political ignorance and indifference are opposite (e.g., Dekker, 1996). Furthermore, political knowledge and political interest are usually treated as measures of cognitive mobilization (Dalton 1984, 2007), a notion used in describing the changing trends in political behaviour. It is argued that, due to rising levels of education, media proliferation, and information access, people became more cognitively mobilized. They are well equipped with skills and resources to make their own independent political decisions without relying on affective or habitual cues (Dalton, 1984, 2007; Dalton & Wattenberg, 2000).

The socio-psychological research on cognitive closure additionally corroborates the view that cognitive factors are causally prior to authoritarianism. For instance, Chirumbolo concluded that “authoritarianism seems to mediate the influence of

need for closure on political orientation” (2001, p. 603, abstr.). Likewise, Roets and Van Hiel (2006) also report that right-wing authoritarianism mediates between cognitive closure and conservatism. It is important to note here that the need for cognitive closure refers to non-political cognitive functioning. In this paper, we deal with explicitly political knowledge and interest, and therefore authoritarianism is more likely to function as a precursor of specific forms of political involvement.

The present research

Regardless of the causal priority, various approaches briefly outlined above all suggest that authoritarianism should be associated with lower political knowledge and the lack of interest in politics. The present study is aimed at analysing the relationship between authoritarianism and three key indicators of cognitive, political involvement: political knowledge, general political interest, and interest in the election campaign. Thus, we will focus on the link between authoritarianism and a general cognitive orientation towards the political world.

In the single existing study that addressed the same problem, Peterson et al. (2002) reported significant negative correlations between the right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and political knowledge among American college students. Those high on the right-wing authoritarianism possessed the less general political knowledge and fewer pieces of specific information related to the 2000 US Presidential elections (see Peterson, Smirles, & Wentworth, 1997). Similarly, interest in politics was lower in the highly authoritarian group. The individuals who scored high on authoritarianism were described as persons alienated and excluded from the political process, which they perceived in terms of rigid categories and impermeable constructs (Peterson et al., 2002).

Our hypothesis about political knowledge resembles the one advanced by Peterson et al. (2002). Given the cognitive rigidity associated with authoritarianism, we would expect that high authoritarians are prone to endorsing the biased views of the political world, relatively less likely to change their incorrect beliefs and to adopt new information that may affect their already existing opinions. The association of authoritarianism with political interest is somewhat less straightforward. As suggested by Peterson et al. (2002), the cognitive closure may predispose one not to seek additional information (given the pre-existing beliefs), and therefore to express lower political interest. Analogously, individuals low in authoritarianism, who are known to show higher openness to experience (e.g., McCrae, 1996), could be expected to show more political interest as well. Peterson et al. (1997, 2002), for instance, provided evidence of a negative association between authoritarianism and political interest.

However, they also proposed that “the lack of any positive relationships between authoritarianism and political interest may indicate that people scoring high on RWA are rather apathetic about politics until social threats begin to accu-

multate" (Peterson et al., 2002, p. 107). Indeed, a recent political upheaval across Europe showed that right-wing extremist (and therefore authoritarian) groups and organizations were the first to mobilize and give voice to their negative attitudes towards the Syrian (and other) refugees. Hence, we expect to obtain evidence of a negative association between political interest and authoritarianism, but bearing in mind the possibility that authoritarianism may be associated with attentiveness to certain political issues contrary evidence seems possible as well.

To summarize, we add to the existing knowledge in several ways. First, we provide fresh empirical evidence on an important but understudied problem. In fact, we aim to provide contextualized evidence, which is particularly needed since the main hypotheses are formulated in a general manner, i.e., not restricted to a specific political and cultural context. Of particular importance is that the analysis is based on the data obtained from a large, national level probability sample. Peterson et al. (2002) used small psychology student samples – as is typical for much of social psychology research. Their respondents, the students of the average age of 18, were certainly not representative of general population either in political knowledge (should be much better informed) or in authoritarianism (psychology students should be low). The authors themselves acknowledged this problem, and suggested "collecting data from people of diverse ages and education levels" (Peterson et al., 2002, p. 108). They also suggested the need to analyse the authoritarianism-political interest association in larger, more diverse samples, which would be important for studying political interest. They speculate that highly authoritarian individuals might, in fact, be a particularly politically involved group, but such individuals might be rare in the usual psychology student samples.

Finally, we devote some attention to the role of education and age in the relationship between authoritarianism and political involvement. Namely, it is known that the latter two variables are associated with education and age. Hence, the association between them might be spurious. For this reason, we compare zero-order associations with those obtained after controlling for the influence of age and education.

Research of the outlined problems gains additional relevance in an unstable political context, such as Serbia. In a number of studies, authoritarianism proved to be an important factor in understanding political attitudes and behaviour in this context, and is often viewed as a major obstacle in the process of democratization of the society. For example, it strongly differentiates the supporters of main political parties in Serbia (Kuzmanović, 2010; Pantić & Pavlović, 2009; Todosijević, 2006, 2013; Todosijević, Pavlović, & Komar, 2015) and negatively influences the support for democracy in general (Pavlović, 2013b, 2014). If those higher on authoritarianism are indeed more cognitively involved in politics, then authoritarianism itself can be viewed as an important driving force of political behaviour and a "threat" to democracy. Still, if, as expected, authoritarianism leads

to political withdrawal and disinterest, its role in political behaviour should be understood quite differently and limited to making them passive.

Method

Participants

The data for the current study come from the Serbian Public Opinion Survey 2012 (SPOS). The SPOS is a post-election survey of public opinion conducted after the May 2012 parliamentary and presidential elections in Serbia. The study was designed to be a nationally representative, high-quality survey, focused on a broad set of attitudes, preferences, and opinions relevant to Serbian political life. It was based on a random sample with multiple stages of selection. The survey was conducted using the computer-assisted personal interviewing mode. Data collection began on December 21, 2012, and ran through to February 10, 2013. The sample included 1568 voting age Serbian citizens. There were slightly more females (51.6%), than males (48.4%) in the sample and the average age was 52 ($SD = 17.49$). Approximately one-fourth of the sample (26.6%) consists of respondents with elementary educational level; 56.5% of respondents finished secondary level of education, while 16.8% graduated at the faculty. Average monthly household income was in a range from 30000–39999 RSD. The statistical analyses presented below include a combined sampling and demographic weight, which means that the analysed sample is representative of the Serbian adult population in terms of age, gender, education, and urban-rural residence.

Data and measures

Authoritarianism. A short, six items scale, which is formulated on the basis of the well-known F scale (Adorno et al., 1950) and the RWA scale (Altemeyer, 1988) was used as a measure of authoritarianism. Similar scales were used and validated in previous studies (Pavlović, 2014; Todosijević, 2006). Each item was followed by a five-point Likert scale. Authoritarianism was operationalized as the first principal component (38% of the total explained variance, $\alpha = .65$). All items have shown positive factor loadings on the first component (see Appendix A, Table A1). Higher scores imply higher authoritarianism.

Political knowledge. Four multiple-choice question knowledge test was used to measure the level of respondents' political knowledge. The respondents answered by choosing one of the four offered answers to the following questions (correct answers are provided in parentheses): (1) Who was the Finance Minister before the recent election? (Mirko Cvetković), (2) What was the unemployment rate in Serbia as of April 2012? (25.5%), (3) Which party or coalition came in second in seats in the National Assembly? ("Izbor za bolji život" – Boris Tadić), and

(4) Who is the current Secretary-General of the United Nations? (Ban Ki-moon). These four questions cover the area of politics often used in the operationalization and measurement of political knowledge – the knowledge of factual politics and the knowledge of foreign affairs (e.g., Delli Karpini & Keeter, 1993, 1996).

Each respondent could provide a correct, incorrect or don't know the answer. The number of correct answers was treated as a measure of the level of political knowledge, with higher scores implying more political knowledge. As such, the incorrect and "don't know" answers were treated as a single response category². In order not to make the main analysis misleading, besides analysing the relationship between authoritarianism and the level of political knowledge, we also analysed the differences in the authoritarianism level between the respondents who gave one of the three possible answers to each political knowledge question (correct/incorrect/don't know). Additionally, we analysed the differences in the level of authoritarianism between three political knowledge groups of respondents on political knowledge test in general – those who systematically gave all of the correct answers (the informed group), those who gave only wrong answers (the misinformed group) and those who gave a DK answer to all of the questions (the uninformed group). In that way, it was possible to analyse the difference in being misinformed and uninformed in regard to authoritarianism in more detail.

Interest in politics. General interest in politics is assessed by the following question: "How interested would you say you are in politics – are you very interested, quite interested, hardly interested, or not at all interested?". The respondents made their estimation on a four-point scale (1 = *Very interested*, 2 = *Quite interested*, 3 = *Hardly interested*, 4 = *Not at all interested*). The scale was recoded so that higher scores imply higher interest in politics.

Campaign following. Specific interest in an election campaign is measured by the following question: "Some people don't pay much attention to political campaigns. How closely did you follow the election campaign – not closely at all, not very closely, fairly closely, or very closely?". The respondents made their estimation on a four-point scale (1 = *not closely at all*, 2 = *not very closely*, 3 = *fairly closely*, 4 = *very closely*). This is treated as a measure of the specific, up-to-date interest in politics. This question, as well as the political knowledge questions and interest in politics, has been extensively tested cross-nationally, since they form a part of the Module 4 questionnaire of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems project (CSES; www.cses.org), which was an integral part of the questionnaire used in our study.

² Some methodological issues regarding the status of "Don't know" answers are heavily debated in the literature. Some argue that when DK answers are included and offered to the respondents (even encouraged by formal instructions etc.), the test scores reflect not just political knowledge but the personality-related propensity to guess as well (Mondak, 1999, 2001). This implies that DK and incorrect answers should not be treated as a single category (Mondak & Anderson, 2004). However, these methodological issues are beyond the scope of this paper. In our survey, DK answers were neither offered nor encouraged, but were registered by interviewers when spontaneously given by the respondent.

Socio-demographic variables. The set of control variables includes measures of education, age, and income. Age is measured in years since birth. Educational level is measured in 8 degrees, following the International Standard Classification of Education, provided by the UNESCO (UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2012). Household income level is operationalized via an eleven-point income scale (from 1 = 0–9999 RSD to 11 = 100000 RSD and more).

Results

In determining the relationship between authoritarianism and cognitive political involvement we proceed as follows. We will first present the inter-correlations of all the variables in the study. Then we will focus on the correlation between authoritarianism and political knowledge, general and specific political interest, after controlling for age, education, and income. In this step of the analysis, we will additionally stress the differences between being misinformed (i.e., giving an incorrect answer) and uninformed (i.e., giving “don’t know” answer) in relation to authoritarianism using ANOVA and post-hoc tests.

Correlation coefficients between variables included in the analysis are shown in Table 1. Concerning the relationship between authoritarianism and political variables, significant correlation coefficient has been registered only between authoritarianism and political knowledge. The relationship is negative – those higher on authoritarianism are less knowledgeable of politics and vice versa, as expected. To each of the political knowledge questions, those lower on authoritarianism gave more correct answers than those higher on authoritarianism. The association is weakest in the case of the unemployment question, and strongest for the UN Secretary General item.

The results also show that one’s authoritarianism level is not systematically related to general and specific interest in politics. In other words, there is no difference in the levels of authoritarianism between those politically indifferent and those who are politically interested.

In accordance with the previous studies, the three socio-demographic variables proved to be significant correlates of authoritarianism and the cognitive political involvement variables. Older respondents ($r = .22, p < .01$), the lower educated ($r = -.23, p < .01$) and lower socio-economic strata ($r = -.12, p < .01$) were more authoritarian than the younger, educated and wealthier participants. In a similar vein, general political interest is positively correlated with education ($r = .17, p < .01$), age ($r = .13, p < .01$) and income ($r = .10, p < .01$). Older ($r = .17, p < .01$), more educated ($r = .13, p < .01$) and more well-off citizens ($r = .07, p < .01$) were more prone to campaign following as well. Finally, education ($r = .28, p < .01$) and income ($r = .17, p < .01$) were positively correlated with political knowledge. There is no significant correlation between age and the overall political knowledge score ($r = -.01, p = .76$). However, some of the individual political

information questions were significantly correlated with age. Older respondents were somewhat better in answering the question about the finance minister ($r = .09, p < .01$), but the younger were more correct about the unemployment rate ($r = -.07, p < .01$). Hence, there may be a specific affinity between age and knowledge of political information in specific areas. For younger people information about unemployment might be more relevant, for instance.

Table 1

Summary of intercorrelations, means and standard deviations for the political variables included in the analysis

	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	Partial r	M	SD	M_{SE}
1. Authoritarianism									-0.03	1.02	0.02
2. Political knowledge score	-.16**							-.13**	1.78	1.16	0.03
3. Q. 1 (Finance Minister)	-.08**	.66**						-.09**	0.44	0.49	0.01
4. Q. 2 (Unemployment rate)	-.09**	.46**	.11**					-.07*	0.17	0.38	0.01
5. Q. 3 (2 nd party in election)	-.10**	.66**	.20**	.12**				-.08*	0.58	0.49	0.01
6. Q. 4 (UN Secretary General)	-.13**	.68**	.25**	.09**	.27**			-.09**	0.58	0.49	0.01
7. Interest in politics	-.03	.29**	.21**	.08**	.20**	.21**		-.03	2.15	0.88	0.02
8. Interest in election campaign	.01	.30**	.19**	.08**	.25**	.20**	.65**	-.01	2.21	0.83	0.02

Note. Column Partial r presents the correlation coefficients between authoritarianism and political variables, controlled for age, education, and income.

** $p < .01$. * $p < .05$.

An important implication of these significant relationships between socio-demographic variables, authoritarianism, and political variables is that the influence of socio-demographic variables should be controlled for. Still, as shown in Table 1, controlling for the influence of the socio-demographic variables did not affect the previously observed relationships much. Correlation coefficients between authoritarianism and political knowledge remained significant and negative (although slightly lower in intensity). The correlation between authoritarianism and general and specific political interest remained non-significant.

Finally, we inspected the relationship between authoritarianism and political knowledge in more scrutiny and compared the level of authoritarianism between

three political knowledge groups of respondents – those who were informed, misinformed and uninformed. On the first, $F(2, 1456) = 5.63, p < .01, \eta^2 = .01$, second, $F(2, 1456) = 5.62, p < .01, \eta^2 = .01$, third, $F(2, 1456) = 6.96, p < .01, \eta^2 = .01$, and fourth knowledge question, $F(2, 1456) = 12.59, p < .01, \eta^2 = .02$ the differences in authoritarianism between those who gave correct, incorrect and “don’t know” answers are significant. As can be seen in Figure 1, those who gave the correct answer to each question are, on the average, the groups lowest in authoritarianism. Yet, the post-hoc tests revealed that the differences occurred mainly between those who gave correct answers on one side, and those who gave incorrect or don’t know answers on the other (mean difference significant at .05 level in every case). In neither case, the mean differences between the misinformed and uninformed group proved to be significant.




Figure 1. The average level of authoritarianism (with the 95% CI) for the three political knowledge groups on four questions of the political knowledge test.

Similarly, the differences in authoritarianism between those who gave only correct (informed type), only incorrect (misinformed type) and only “don’t know” (uninformed type) answers on each question were analysed as well (see Figure

2). Although the number of respondents included in this analysis decrease dramatically (92 informed, 14 misinformed and 62 uninformed respondents in total), three groups of respondents still differ significantly in authoritarianism, $F(2, 166) = 9.80, p < .01, \eta^2 = .11$.




Figure 2. The average level of authoritarianism (with the 95% confidence intervals) for the three political knowledge groups.

The informed group is, on the average, lowest on authoritarianism, while the misinformed group obtained the highest authoritarianism scores. However, the post-hoc tests revealed significant differences between the informed and misinformed respondents ($p < .05$), as well as between the informed and uninformed ones ($p < .01$). Still, the difference in authoritarianism between the two less politically sophisticated groups, the misinformed and uninformed, does not gain significance ($p = .69$). In other words, the view that the higher authoritarian persons are more inclined to erroneously guess an answer than to simply say “don’t know” is *not* supported by our data.

Discussion

The results of this study have shown that persons who are higher on authoritarianism tend to be less politically knowledgeable. This is quite in line with the limited empirical evidence obtained on smaller, student samples and in different socio-cultural contexts (Peterson et al., 2002). Since the data for the present study were collected from the general public, i.e., respondents diverse in age, educational and income levels, and in a different political and cultural context, the link between authoritarianism and political knowledge seems robust, although of modest magnitude. It also proved that the link cannot be considered spurious, since it remained virtually unaffected after introducing the basic socio-economic controls.

Such findings support the theories that describe authoritarian individuals as tending towards political ignorance. Whether authoritarianism is associated with cognitive rigidity (Adorno et al., 1950), cognitive "shortcomings" (Altemeyer, 1996), identified as a part of a rigid construct system (Peterson et al., 2002) or a dogmatic world-view (Rokeach, 1960), it seems that the less accurate knowledge of politics accompanies higher authoritarianism. The question of the direction of influence, however, remains open. In the original conception, authoritarianism was treated as a personality trait, with deeply-seated, subconscious motivation, where avoidance of information inconsistent with adopted beliefs is psychologically adaptive.

Subsequent research found that authoritarianism indeed correlates with various relevant psychological variables – dogmatism (Rokeach, 1960), openness to experience (Peterson et al., 1997), the personal need for structure (Altemeyer, 1998) or the need for cognitive closure (Chirumbolo, 2001) (for a comprehensive overview, see Jost et al., 2003), all describing the tendencies of a person high on authoritarianism to seek certainty (i.e. avoid uncertainty), cling to familiar, arrive at premature conclusions and impose rigid categories and stereotypes. New pieces of information bring changes or call into question the established knowledge structures, which those seeking certainty urge to escape.

In a similar vein, lower knowledge on politics in general terms could be the result of a tendency of those higher on authoritarianism to neglect information critical to legitimate political authority (Adorno et al., 1950; Altemeyer, 1988; Cohrs & Moschner, 2002). This interpretation would not apply to the present findings, though. The included measures of political knowledge are ideologically neutral, and therefore should not resonate especially with high authoritarianism. The idea that there may be some specific knowledge domains in which those higher on authoritarianism outperform those who are lower remains for the future research.

Contrary to the initial expectations, authoritarianism proved unrelated to the political interest variables. The included political interest variables represent an overall cognitive orientation towards the world of politics. Although originally described as a personality-related determinant of ideological preferences (Adorno

et al., 1950), authoritarianism does not seem to have a prominent motivational potential in political terms. There are no differences in the authoritarianism level among those who are interested and those disinterested in politics in Serbia. This is different from Peterson et al. (2002), where in both of their student samples they found that authoritarianism “was significantly negatively related to personal interest in politics” (p. 104). As elaborated in the introductory part, the predictions about the relationships between authoritarianism and political interest were tentative. The bulk of theoretical arguments lead to an expectation of lower interest among highly authoritarian individuals. This, for instance, could be due to their lower openness to experience (e.g., McCrae, 1996). Yet, the expectation is not borne out. The hypothesis, proposed by Peterson et al. (2002), that it may be due to biased samples not containing the sufficient number of highly authoritarian individuals is not applicable here. The present sample was designed to be nationally representative of adult citizens of Serbia. Besides, interest and knowledge should be interrelated – a prominent interest should lead to greater knowledge and *vice versa*. Yet, authoritarianism is significantly related to political knowledge, but not to political interest. It could imply that the interested authoritarians gravitate towards the less informative sources of news and information.

Some alternative hypotheses will be offered here, one methodological and another contextual. The political interest variables, unlike the political information questions, are subjective, self-assessment variables. Hence, political interest answers might be subject to various influences, such as, for instance, social desirability. In particular, authoritarian individuals, being conventional, might feel more pressure to provide socially desirable answers (being interested in politics), and therefore directly affect the relationship examined here.

Another possibility is that expressions of political interest are affected by the political context. The survey was conducted some 6–7 months after the elections. In a study conducted some time before the 2012 elections in Serbia, it had been found that the supporters of the Serbian Progressive Party, the national conservative party that won the elections, were highest on authoritarianism (Kuzmanović, 2010). Hence, after the elections, the satisfaction with political life was probably higher among the more authoritarian individuals. At the time of the survey, those relatively lower on authoritarianism might have felt disappointed in the election outcome and the post-election developments, and therefore expressed lower political interest than otherwise. For instance, the previously ruling Democratic Party collapsed after the elections, and split into several fractions, thus providing a bleak political perspective for those who previously supported them.

The two factors are interrelated – the subjective character of the variable makes it more susceptible to the influence of the political context. We would suggest that these issues be addressed in future research since subjective political interest variables are often used in comparative research. This is somewhat different from the argument that in politically quiet times authoritarians are in their “normal”, politically apathetic state and the feeling of threat would mobilize them

(Doty, Peterson, & Winter, 1991). The point advocated here is that certain socio-political conditions may have leveled up the expected relationship. Those low on authoritarianism may have expressed a lack of interest in politics, leveling off the differences in political interest in regard to authoritarianism.

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AUTORITARNOST I POLITIČKA KOGNICIJA

U radu se analizira veza između autoritarnosti i političke kognicije, operacionalizovane preko tri indikatora: politička informisanost, opšte interesovanje za politiku, i zainteresovanost za izbornu kampanju. Polazi se od hipoteze da su osobe sa višim stepenom autoritarnosti slabije politički informisane i manje zainteresovane za politiku, što proizilazi iz njihovog izrazitijeg otpora novim informacijama i menjanju usvojenih stavova. Ova hipoteza proizilazi iz klasičnog pisa autoritarne ličnosti, ali do sada nije adekvatno empirijski proverena. Podaci dolaze iz post-izbornog istraživanja javnog mnjenja, sprovedenog nakon predsedničkih i parlamentarnih izbora 2012. godine. Anketirano je 1568 građana Srbije, odabranih metodom slučajnog izbora. Rezultati pokazuju da je autoritarnost u negativnoj korelaciji sa političkom informisanošću. S druge strane, opšta politička zainteresovanost i zainteresovanost za izbornu kampanju nisu u korelaciji sa nivoom autoritarnosti. Ove asocijacije su stabilne i nakon uvođenja statističke kontrole za osnovne socio-demografske variable. Dodatno poređenje pogrešno informisanih i neinformisanih grupa ispitanika (onih koji su dali pogrešne odgovore, i onih koji su odgovorili da ne znaju tačan odgovor) nije dalo podršku viđenju da su autoritarne osobe sklonije pogađanju odgovora nego tome da jednostavno odgovore da ne znaju. Analiza je zaključena tezom da je veza između autoritarnosti i političke informisanosti zasnovana na dubljim psihološkim procesima, dok je veza (odnosno nedostatak veze) sa interesovanjem za politiku više pod uticajem političkog konteksta.

Cljučne reči: autoritarnost, politička informisanost, zainteresovanost za politiku, Srbija

Appendix A

Table A

Authoritarianism Scale: Factor loadings on the first principal component

	Loadings
The most important virtues a child has to learn are obedience and respect for authority.	.70
Young people sometimes have rebellious thoughts, but as they grow up, they should condemn these and adapt.	.58
Immoral conditions in our country are partly due to the fact that both teachers and parents forgot that physical punishment is still the best way of upbringing.	.50
It would be better for everyone if the authorities censored the newspapers and films and other media so that rubbish be kept away from the youth.	.69
Most of our social problems would be solved if we got rid of the immoral and pervert persons.	.69
People can be divided into two groups: the strong and the weak.	.52

Note. Extraction method – Principal Component Analysis; 38.18% of the explained variance.

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testova i oznaka treba da budu napisani u kurzivu, sem ako je reč o grčkim simbolima koji se ne pišu u kurzivu.

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