UTICAJ AUTORSTVA NA PROCENU DUBOKOUMNOSTI PSEUDODUBOKOUMNIH VERBALIZAMA: KO IZGOVARA I KO VERUJE U BESMISLICE?

  • Sandra Ilić Laboratorija za eksperimentalnu psihologiju, Odeljenje za psihologiju, Filozofski fakultet, Univerzitet u Beogradu
  • Kaja Damnjanović Laboratorija za eksperimentalnu psihologiju, Odeljenje za psihologiju, Filozofski fakultet, Univerzitet u Beogradu
Ključne reči: aktivno mišljenje otvorenog uma, efekat autorstva, kognitivna refleksija, pristrasnost uverenja, pseudodubokoumni verbalizmi

Apstrakt

Pseudodubokoumni verbalizmi (PDV) su gramatički i sintaksički ispravne rečenice sačinjene od nasumično odabranih reči, dizajnirane da impresioniraju čitaoca, a ne da ga informišu. Istraživanja pokazuju da su ispitanici skloni da PDV smatraju dubokoumnim, a pretpostavlja se da u osnovi toga leže dva mehanizma: pristrasno odgovaranje i smanjena sklonost prema kognitivnoj refleksiji. Ipak, na receptivnost na PDV može da utiče i izvor iskaza, tj. moguće je da ispitanici pretpostavljaju da iskazi prikazani u psihološkoj studiji imaju duboko i mudro značenje koje oni ne registruju, ali veruju da postoji. Cilj istraživanja bio trostruk: 1) ispitivanje fenomena PDV na srpskom jeziku, 2) replikacija nalaza o mehanizmima receptivnosti i senzitivnosti (sposobnost razlikovanja PDV i zaista dubokoumnih iskaza) na PDV i 3) provera uticaja izvora iskaza na te mere. Ispitanici su procenjivali dubokoumnost poslovica, zdravorazumskih istinitih zaključaka (ZIZ) i PDV (bez i sa pripisanim autorima različite pouzdanosti). Rešavali su 16 kategoričkih silogizama (KS) različitih po kongruentnosti između logičnosti i uverljivosti zaključka, numerički (CRT) i nenumerički test kognitivne refleksije (nCRT), i popunili su skalu verovanja o aktivnom mišljenju otvorenog uma (AOT). Ispitanici su PDV procenjivali kao više dubokoumne od ZIZ i manje dubokoumne od poslovica. Korelacije CRT, nCRT, AOT i CS sa receptivnošću i senzitivnošću na PDV su neznačajne. Kada se PDV-u pripiše izmišljeni autor ili autor upitne pouzdanosti procene dubokoumnosti ostaju statistički iste, dok procene značajno rastu kada se PDV-u pripiše pouzdani autor. Nalazi o kognitivnoj refleksiji i pristrastnosti odgovaranja kao mehanizmima receptivnosti i senzitivnosti na PDV nisu replicirani. Rezultati pokazuju da izvor kao faktor konteksta utiče na receptivnost i senzitivnost na PDV.

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